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Blair Hoxby, Mammon*% Music: Literature and Econom
ics in the Age of Milton, New Haven: Yale University
Press, 2002. Pp. ix + 320. $45.00.
Reviewed by Kimherly S. Latta, University of Pitts
burgh

his ambitious and well-written book argues that "economic
f
/ discourse made literary history swerve in the seventeenth
^century...by posing new moral and aesthetic problems for
authors" that made them "innovate formally and.. .reimagine such basic
notions as self, community, and empire" (1-2). Blair Hoxby builds his
argument on a central set of readings of Milton's prose and poetry,
beginning with Comus and ending with Samson, from which he extends
strategic readings of poetry by John Dryden, William Davenant, John
Denham, Edmund Waller and a few other poets. He is fundamentally
interested in the ways in which what he calls "economic discourse" altered
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the way these writers viewed and represented their world. To that end he
draws upon a wealth of tracts on commerce, complaints about monopoly,
and political writings from the period.
The structural hinge upon which the entire argument moves is kind
of history of Milton's responses to what Hoxby terms the "the new
economic discourse" of the seventeenth-century, a discourse that, he
claims, held that "economic forces operated with an abstract inevitability
that made them akin to natural forces and similarly resistant to moral
analysis" (14). The Milton who emerges in Hoxby's book is a man easily
moved by the winds of trade, now convinced by free circulation advocates,
now repulsed by commercial rhetoric. According to Hoxby, the author of
Comus rejected the "new economic discourse" (11) and voiced a preference
for "hoarding" over trade and exchange (24). Only a few years later, the
controversy over monopolies and views expressed by persons such as Sir
Edward Coke changed Milton's mind. Thus in Areopagitica Milton
responded to the Stationers' Company and the Long Parliament's
Licensing Order of 14June 1643, "not just with a vindication of liberty in
the face of oppression" but with a "new ideal of the way the public sphere
should operate" that relied "on the theories and arguments of free trade
advocates" (26). Hoxby claims that in this tract Milton's goal was "to
initiate a virtuous cycle in which the right system of commerce and
exchange would not only advance truth but improve those who partici
pated in it" (52). Milton defended this "system" in the regicide tracts as
well, Hoxby maintains, believing that "men" would be free from political
and religious and economic oppression only "once the marketplace of
ideas [was] opened" (55). (Hoxby does not ask whether Milton imagined,
or cared, that free trade emancipated women as well.) Milton carried this
utoptian vision forward in The Tenure of Kings and Magistrates (1649),
Eikonoklastes (1649), as well as in his defenses of the English people of
1651 and 1654 , where he recognized that "the restraint of trade" often
served "as a favorite device of arbitrary government" and held on to a
"faith in free trade" (53, 55). Relying on slender evidence, Hoxby claims
that the Hartlib circle shared these enthusiasms, partioilarly the idea that
"information could be traded just like a commodity," with Milton, and that
this consensus demonstrates "the extent to which reformers in the
1640s.. .thought in terms of the ^sterns of production and exchange that
would be most likely to generate wealth...and truth. What was needed was
a free way of trading" (50-51, my emphasis). Yet in the years leading up to
and direcdy after the Restoration, Milton experienced a "deep intellectual
crisis" that led him to lose his faith in the ability of fallen human beings to
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function properly in this system. In his darker moments, Hoxby suggests,
Milton may have have entertained the same argument that Hume was to
voice much later, namely that trade was animated by "a spirit of avarice"
(89).Thusin TheUkeliestMeansto^moveHirelingsand TheReacHeand
Easy
(1660) Milton denounced tradesmen and those who would "set
to sale religion, liber tie, honourj safetie, all concernments divine or human
to keep up trading" (cit. 88) while still advocating a faint faith in &ee trade.
Hoxby's Milton believed on the one hand that "letting market forces
penetrate the political sphere" would lead to "civil and religious liberty."
On the other hand, he saw"that trade was the people's rallying cry back to
Egypt" (90). Hoxby implicitly blames Milton's disillusionment in the
possibility of sustaining the "right system" (i.e., free trade) on royalist
propaganda, which united an ideology of military might with commercial
power. Paradise Lost (1667, 1674), then, can be imderstood as a direct
response to Dryden's Annus Mirabilus, which married the absolutist and
imperialist ambitions of Charles II to the commercial ideology that, so
tainted, could no longer propound an vision of an open and free society.
What Dryden embraced, Milton despised. Eyeing the author of Annus
Mirabilus as his chief "poetic and political foil" (151) in Paradise Lost,Milton
exchanged his earlier vision of a libertarian Utopia for "a dark view of
economic intercourse" (152). His change of heart complete \sx Samson,
Milton adopted the same traditional, hoarding ethic he originally embraced
in Comus and rejected "Areopagiticds hope that economic processes might
spread the light of God" (235).
Hoxby pays close attention to detail and draws upon a rich array of
historical, architectural, and political records to make his case. His
argument that the topic about which these authors were writing—
trade—^was itself resistant to narrative modes of representation and
therefore forced poets to think in terms of maps, charts, and panoramas,
for example, is worth considering, as is his problematixation of labor in
Samson. As for Hoxby's Whiggish argument, which offers a uniquely
modern blend of libertarian neoconservatism with an old-fashioned
celebration of Protestant individualism and radical humanism, I can only
say that the controversy it will stimulate should be welcomed in the spirit
of deliberate debate that Milton himself encouraged.
Still, it must be said that it is mysterious and troubling that Hoxby
spends little time considering attitudes towards commerce as ^//i/Wissues,
never once referring to De Doctrina Christiana (not even to doubt its
provenance), for it is there that Milton definitively expressed his views
about the morality of commercial practices. This oversight probably stems
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from Hoxby's view of Milton as already committed to a secular under
standing of trade as something that either contributed to the wealth or.
impoverishment of the land rather than as a religious or ethical problem
having to do with charity. Milton was committed less to the "rule of the
saints," he argues, than to an attempt to "firame a polity that would not
only accommodate but seek to preserve the secular tights and opportuni
ties of an unregenerate majority" (238). It is hard to imagine Milton having
a concept of "secular" rights separable from spiritual obligations, and
much harder to think of him defending the opportunities of the unregener
ate.
Contrary to Hoxby's assertion that Milton put his "faith not in men
but in a system of commerce and exchange" (47), DeDoctrinaAemonstiztes
that the poet thought that the legitimacy of each and every economic
transaction depended solely upon the intentionality, the moral status, of its
agent—his or her conscience and commitment to charity. Milton's varying
representations of commerce as positive and negative explicate not a
wavering commitment for and against "free trade," but rather his
distinction between ^es of capital generation. He allowed for commercial
activity conducted by agents who served charity and disapproved of that
conducted by agents who served their own avarice or li^t Hoxby
approaches this insight when he admits, while distancing himself from
historians who have represented Milton as unilaterally anti-commercial,
that he understands that "to speak in terms of an enthusiasm for or
hostility towards commerce is to employ standards that are too imprecise,
for as Milton and his contemporaries well knew, not all forms of com
merce are created equal." Unfortunately, Hoxby buries this insight in a
footnote (306n) and holds fast to his dominant argument, which is that
Milton first rejected, then endorsed, and finally became disillusioned with
the "new economic discourse."
The problem with this assertion is that it treats "economic discourse"
anachronistically and even tautologically, as something that produced a
notion of a "system" of trade firom a point of view that logically could only
exist after "economics" had become conceptually distinct firom the larger
providential order—^an event that even Hoxby admits did not really take
place until the late eighteenth century. Treating economic discourse as
somehow prior to the other discourses with which it emerged simulta
neously, for example, Hoxby argues that economic thought prompted
Milton's innovations in political philosophy. Throughout the seventeenth
century most people regarded the bewildering variety of commercial
transactions not as a "system," a cohesive unity governed by internal laws
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and resistant to the purview of moral scrutiny, but rather as aspects of a
larger cosmos pervaded by Spirit, within which what we might tentatively
call "economic discourse" remained intertwined with other emergent
discourses of the social order^—of domesticity, politics, science, the arts,
or religion, for example. Hoxby, however, often speaks about "economic
discourse" as something that had already separated from its compldc
semantic net, a "free trade" rhetoric in which the economy is already
recognized as a comprehensible, cohesive object of scrutiny, a system with
its own internal laws. Yet in fact many of the materials Hoxby examines cry
out for a more complex understanding of "economic discourse" as one
that interacted with and was mutually determined by discourses of religion
and sex. These materials include a masque in which a witch's son attempts
to seduce a maid through economic reasoning; a tract in which truth
springs from a teeming womb; a drama {Ambagna) that, by Hoxby's
admission, "emphasizes the equation between commercial relations and
sexual relations" (84); representations of Britannia and Amsterdam as
women receiving merchant-adventurer suitors; and poems that ponder the
vital heat that "begets" trade. By failing to give due consideration to the
complex linguistic network in which economic discourse emerged, by
treating it as though it had inore weight than other discourses, which could
inflect, even modify it, but never obtain the same purchase it had upon
them, this book risks reiterating the materialist analysis that its author
eschews in the introduction (5). I think Hoxby tries to avoid this, and
succeeds at times (for example, when he considers Dryden's panegyrics as
a confluence of political and sexual and commercial rhetoric), but that,
especially when discussing Milton, he falls into habits of reading according
to which economic tracts—which he assumes reflect real economic
realities—function as the base from which the superstructure of Milton's
and Dryden's and others' literary works spring. Nevertheless, because this
book gets right into the thick of things, combining attention to form and
the way poems signify with a lively interest in material history, it makes a
welcome contribution to our ongoing sifting and winnowing of the poetry
and politics of seventeenth-century England.

*
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Adam Sutcliffe, Judaism and Enlightenment. Cam
bridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003. Pp. xv + 314.
$60.00.
Reviewed by Heidi Kaufman^ University of Delaware
Adam Sutcliffe's Judaism and Enlightenment offers a compelling response to
ongoing debates about the place, position, influence, and shape of Jewish
history and culture in the "Enlightenment Project." Although several
nations adopted and integrated the democratic spirit—^liberty, freedom,
and equality—Sutcliffe reminds us that the full power of these ideals has
never been fiiUy realized. He begins by wondering, as many before him
have, "is this because we need more Enlightenment, or have we already
had a good deal too much?" (1). Unlike his predecessors, Sutcliffe
approaches this and other related questions by looking at the ways in which
the history of European Jewry and the influence of Hebrew writing helped
shape and define "the detailed contours of eighteenth-century European
thought" (1). Whereas most studies of the Enlightenment tend to look at
Christian culture or at questions of difference as they relate to colonialism,
slavery, or the presence of non-Europeans in Europe, Sutcliffe's impressive
study reminds us of the diverse nature of European society itself. Along
these lines, his book illuminates how and why "the complexities clustered
around Judaism are of central importance for a general understanding of
the Enlightenment" (6). Sutcliffe proceeds from there, remaining focused
on the exchange and interplay of Jewish and Christian intellectual history
as it played a central role in defining secular and religious debates over
national identity, human origins, time, history, reason, God, and religious
tolerance, to name just a few.
Judaism and Enlightenment is structured around three sections. In the
first, "The Crumbling of Old Certainties: Judaism, the Bible and the
Meaning of History," Sutcliffe looks at the influence of Hebrew texts on
Enlightenment theological and philosophical debates. Christian Hebraists,
such as Martin Luther, Johannes Buxtorf, and Constantijn L'Empereur,
Sutcliffe argues, helped to shape the internationalism of Hebrew scholar
ship throughout Europe. By the mid-sixteenth century, Hebraists began to
"cross-fertilize" (42) with Christian political thinkers. Along these lines,
many considered the ancient Hebrews to be "a divine model for the
regulation of a godly community" (43). As a result, "the study of the
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political institutions of what became known as The Republic of the
Hebrews' emerged at this time as a new genre of Humanist scholarship"
(43). In this chapter, Sutcliffe looks specifically at the Dutch Republic and
England, as both nations carved their Christian national identities out of
Jewish models. In the following chapter, Sutcliffe moves on to discuss the
manner in which "Judaism emerged as a key point of intellectual reference"
for theological debates about the "mythic Judaic origins" (60) of Christian
ity as well as larger debates, as he shows with his discussion of Jacques
Basnage and Pierre Bayle, over "the contorted complexities of moral
judgement" (96) with regard to disputes about reason and God. Sutcliffe
does a wonderful job of integrating religious debates within historical
conceptions of time, calendars, and the primacy of the Bible and Biblical
Jews in European history.
While Sutcliffe focuses primarily on Judaism's role in shaping
Enlightemnent debates about Christianity and Reason in the first part of
his book. Part Two, "Judaism and the Formation of Enlightenment
Radicalism," looks at Christianity's influence in Jewish debates about
reason and God. His point is not that these two fields happened to
coincide, but that they were entangled with each other from the start.
Sutcliffe adds that even though the Jewish Enlightenment, or Haskalah, did
not take place until later in the eighteenth century, by the seventeenth
century Jewish communities throughout Europe were clearly interested in
the interplay of theological debates within the cultural realm. He explains
that "in the early eighteenth century Qewish communities] increasingly
absorbed the fashions and values of the prevailing secular culture" (103).
Moreover, not only wereJewish philosophers and religious figures engaged
in a process of "cross-fertilization" with non-Jews, but dissent from within
theJewish communities "both prefigured and directly influenced later nonJewish Early Enlightenment debate" (103). Sutcliffe includes in this
discussion, among others, Uriel Da Costa, Isaac Orobio de Castro, and
Baruch Spinoza as he argues that Christians interested in convertingJews
became fascinated by Jewish arguments against Christianity as well as
Hebrew texts like the Pentateuch or the Kabbalah. This, in turn, led
Christians to revise their own philosophical and religious engagement with
God. Juggling several European communities at once, Sutcliffe balances
the specificities of communal life with the larger European debates of
which they were a part. Perhaps most important is Sutcliffe's insistence
that the Sephardic community in Amsterdam played a central role in the
Enlightenment. He explains, "the distinctively intense tensions of early
Sephardi Amsterdam had a powerful and destabilising impact on the
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intellectual life of Europe as a whole" (117). Although Sutcliffe returns to
Spinoza in every section of his book, his point seems to be not that this
single man, as a Jew ex-communicated from his Jewish community, made
a powerful impact on European thought, but rather than Jewish culture,
history, and language played a tremendous, and often unrecognized, role
in the Enlightenment project. Indeed, Sutcliffe claims boldly, Spinoza was
"the first thoroughly secular individual in European history" (134).
The third and final part, "Judaism, Nationhood and the Politics of
Enlightenment," braids together and grows out of the two previous
sections. Here, Sutcliffe examines the shared contexts of Jewish and
Christian traditions, or the "universalisation of Judaism" (211) in the works
of John Toland, Pietro Giannone, John Locke, and Pierre Bayle. In this
section Sutcliffe includes interesting and innovative interpretations of
Spinoza's influence on the Enlightenment, as well as Jewish participation
in the debates about religious toleration. Overall, Sutcliffe handles a lot of
material with clarity and thoroughness while also, remarkably, changing the
paradigm traditionally deployed in discussions of Jewish and Christian
relations. In other words, Sutcliffe's argument, which is more far reaching
than just the Enlightenment, offers a new way of reading the diversity and
heterogeneity within European culture. Having argued that Judaism was
drawn into the Enlightenment through an "intricate web of fascination and
repulsion" (19), he proceeds with the only logical conclusion that Jewish
and Christian traditions (historical, cultural, diasporic, philosophical, and
theological) have always been woven together while simultaneously
retaining elements of distinction. His extensive discussions of Mendels
sohn, Spinoza, Locke, and Bayle enact the point he has made all
along—that Jewish and Christian intellectual history must be read within
the context of one another and not as two concurrent debates. The final
chapter on Voltaire's ambivalence toward Jewish and Hebrew people and
history is an apt ending to such a study. Sutcliffe maintains that Voltaire's
oeuvre is a culmination and synthesis of the "major ideas and arguments
that had emerged since the late seventeenth century" (233). This final
discussion serves to underscore both the content and approach of the
earlier chapters.
Sutcliffe's Judaism andEnIightenmentihsmct\y\i'i^ttce.titca.ia.c7^VJ0^
that examinesJewish influences on Christian culture and history in Europe,
such asJames Shapiro's Shakespeare and the Jems (Columbia University Press,
1996) or Jonathan Hess's Germans, Jews, and the Claims of Modernity (Yale
University Press, 2002). Sutcliffe's study is original and thorough on many
levels, but largely because he illuminates the ways in which Jewish and
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Christian religious and philosophical traditions continue to shape one
another throughout the Enlightenment. At one point, Sutdiffe explains
that while many in the late seventeenth century dismissed rabbinic
scholarship as irrelevant, a core of intellectual humanists remained loyal to
this body of texts, maintaining that all opinions and sources must be
considered in scholarly inquiry. The tension between these two views was
enhanced by the emerging "Republic of Letters" or publications containing
book reviews allowing "would-be savants to acquire a veneer of up-to-date
erudition," which "led to a widespread anxiety that book reviews were
being used as a substimte to reading the actual books" (32). This statement
rings true not only of those Enlightenment thinkers interested in ancient
languages, but also of contemporary readers of this review. Sutcliffe's work
is one that makes a significant scholarly contribution to European
intellectual history and will be read and re-read for many years to come.

Alain Cabantous, Blasphemy: Impious Speech in the
West from the Seventeenth to the Nineteenth Century.
Translated by Eric Rauth. New York: Columbia Univer
sity Press, 2002. Pp. xi + 288. $33.00. Originally pub
lished as Histoire du blaspheme en Occident: Fin
XVF-milieu XDC siecle. Paris: Editions Albin Michel
S. A., 1998.
Reviewed by Peter S. Fosl, Transylvania University
This book presents claims that at once seem both obvious and trivial (and
therefore disappointing and also subtle and important (and therefore
fascinating. Anyone with even a cursory understanding of thegeneral lines
of interpretation that describe the relation of church, state, and society in
early modern times will find the following theses of this text unsurprising:
that both church and state suppressed blasphemy as sinful and subversive;
that this suppression varied according to time and place; that as the
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centralized state became more powerful it arrogated to itself the determination and punishment of blasphemy; that the rise of secularism resulted in
a declining concern with blasphemy and its prosecution; and that today
practices analogous to blaspheming and its punishment may be discerned.
These are the sorts of themes articulated in manjf introductory level
courses on this period.
One may also be forgiven a yawn in the face of the mounting
literature demonstrating how this or that small aspect of early modern
culture is subversive or restive, how obscure subplots or dirty pictures or
bad words undermine so-called regimes or economies of power and
hegemony. We seriously undertake such projects as if such things actually
matter politically, as if by indignantly asserting that they do matter we
could convince others (and ourselves) that we who are immersed in such
things really do matter. It seems sometimes enough to raise a blush on
even Terry Eagleton's weathered cheeks.
On the other hand, the deployment of concepts related to the sacred
in negotiating, manipulating, disciplining, distributing, and exercising
power was and remains no small matter—especially now as new theocratic
devices have emerged. In a culture where constitutions are amended on the
basis of vague remarks in Leviticus, where the faithful flock to snuff films
depicting the vivisection of their savior, and where the flashing of a cloying
celebrity's nipple provokes more outrage than the naked failure of electoral
machinery, the lines of power and discipline woven through conceptions
of the divine deserve a good, hard look. Any work, therefore, that explores
those conceptions and the practices that they articulate with the detail,
erudition, and sweep exhibited by Gabantous's book must be counted as
truly important, if not crucial.
Cabantous is professor of modern history at the University of Paris,
Pantheon Sorbonne. His prior work has largely focused on maritime
topics, for example: La vergue et les fers: mutins et deserteun dans la marine de
I'ancienne France, XVIl'-XVIU' siecles (Paris; Tallandier, 1984); and Fes C8les
barbares: pilleures d'epaves et sodetes Morales en France, 1680-1830 (Paris:
Fayard, 1993). His interest in early modern blasphemy generally was
ignited, in fact, by his inquiries into the specific practice and its treatment
among sailors and naval authorities. Eric Rauth is an experienced
translator, and his able translation presents Gabantous's text in a readable
and felicitous way (though the modification of the title seems a bit
meretricious, and perhaps misleading).
Blasphemy is, of course, an ancient concept, and Gabantous does a
reasonably sound job in sketching its pre-modern career. Early medieval
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Christian figures were generally content to appeal simply to the remarks on
blasphemy found in Scripture as well as in the remarks of early ecclesiasti
cal and patristic figures, figures whose interests circled around determining
the boundaries of early Christian membership, practice, theology, and
political power. More active theorizingabout blasphemy surfaced later with
advancing scholasticism as philosophers worked to define the concept and
determine its precise relations to other concepts, such as sin.
As early modernity emerged in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries,
blasphemy was principally identified, determined, and punished by
ecclesiastical instruments, but in different ways in different locales. The
articulations of these variations are particularly impressive in this book, as
is its correlative demonstration of the impossibility of offering a universal
definition or description of blasphemy and the reactions to it. For example,
rooting out blasphemy was the concern principally of the Inquisition in
Spain, especially in the harassment and repression of Jewish conversos and
Muslims who had escaped expulsion by converting to Christianity, but
whose sincerity was always in doubt and whom the crown thought Spain
would be better off without, anyway. Elsewhere, the peculiar manifesta
tions of the Counter-Reformation and other political and theological
contests generated the changing contexts within which blasphemy would
be defined, discovered, and dealt with in changing ways. Cabantous
masterfully documents with a social scientist's acumen the specific
variations in the struggle against blasphemy, documenting for example the
frequency with which the second commandment was invoked, the range
of expressions considered blasphemous, and the complex and multidimen
sional ideologies motivating prosecution.
In a theological and institutional world defined by "the Word" and
the "holy name," blasphemous speech designates many things. An
inversion of the sacred Word, it is a challenge to the very heart of the
constellation of beliefs that underwrite the ideological order. It is therefore
a sign of corruption, treachery, or sedition; indeed, not simply a sign, it is
such an assault in itself (5). Blasphemy signals the peril of an individual
soul, the pollution of a society struggling against faUenness, and a site of
vulnerability to the assaults of heretics. As acts of blasphemy might call the
wrath of God down not only upon the blasphemer but also upon his or
her entire community, blasphemy was much more than an individual affair.
The order of things ecclesiastical is determined through the use of
words and performative utterances in, for example, prayer, consecration,
ordination, absolution, matrimony, baptism, taking oaths, blessings,
excommunication, prohibition, judgment, and edict. These discursive
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practices identify membership, standing, and exclusion; they determine the
distribution, exercise, and limitations of power. To challenge the use of.
crucial words, to use specified words in forbidden ways, is to threaten all
this and to become the dangerous other—an other which, like the
twentieth-century American communist or twenty-first century terrorist,
is needed to unify and order and sustain a narrative of siege, assault, and
heroic struggle. The boundaries of speech relevant to these concepts and
others that relate the human to the divine and to other humans must be
therefore secure, sacrosanct, and effectively policed. But transgressions
must also be identified, discovered, and rooted out. Blasphemy must not
only be understood and resisted; it must be found. Cabantous's text is at
its best when it pursues lines of analysis and interpretation like these. His
reflections, however, are too often stunted by the crushing demands of
detailed and wide ranging historical exploration—exploration that,
considering the vast scope of his undertaking, seems alternatively thrilling,
amazing, excessive, patchy, and overwhelming, perhaps impossible and
vain.
The political order of early modernity was of course also underwritten
by appeals to the divine—the divine rights of kings, the order of theanimal
kingdom and the rest of Creation, the political demands of Scripture and
earthly Christendom. As modernity advanced, the state and its vanous
layers of sovereignty (central, regional, religious, civil, ethnic, and local)
engaged in a complex dance with the churches by complementing,
cooperating, contradicting, and gradually wresting control of the terrain of
blasphemy. Just as Richelieu pulled down the walls of provincial towns in
supplanting local with national authority, the centralized monarchial state
extended the domain of its legal and disciplinary power over matters
concerned with blasphemous activity. In doing so the economies of
blasphemy were, as time passed, reconfigured in ways less threatening to
both its targets and its purveyors.
The state increasingly paid lip service to the crime's gravity (which the Catholics still maintain) but administered less severe punishments.
Enlightenment social theory and criticism, together with the dissections of
legal scrutiny, also had a soporific effect on both blasphemy and reactions
to it. In 1697 it was possible for a young Edinburgh student, Thomas
Aikenhead, to be hanged after having been convicted of blasphemy by a
civil court, under Parliamentary law, with the affirmation of ecclesiastical
authorities. (Cabantous takes note of this case, but mistakenly identifies the
year as 1695 [68].) Half a century later, however, when the General
Assembly of the Kirk wished to prosecute another son of Edinburgh,
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David Hiime, the civil authorities remained uninvolved and the Assembly
dismissed the case when Hume's friends argued that since Hume was no
Christian the Kirk had no authority over him. Blasphemy became in the
late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries less a matter of sin and
subversion than of middle class and bourgeois propriety.
That is except for the French Revolution and its offspring. With the
Revolution, the power concentrated in the central authority of the
monarch was transmuted into something new. Just as Descartes's
methodological doubt demanded a total razing in the name of a new
science of all prior belief, the new revolutionary discourses demanded a
total cleansing of the social, political and discursive order in the name of
constructing an ideal determined through abstract political philosophy. In
this context, concepts orbiting around the "Republic," the "citizen,"
"rights," "liberty," "equality," and the "people" took on a quasi-sacred
quality against which other discursive practices could be condemned and
repressed. (Indeed, the discourses concerned with "repression," "power,"
and "hegemony" are inheritors of this cultural shift, despite postmodern
pretensions to the contrary.)
This new space of sacred and blasphemous speech provoked a
reaction from the agents of its opponents and predecessors. Denunciations
of the Revolution and of progressive modern secularism as vast blasphe
mies themselves infused the Church with new energy. This line of
theocratic and traditionalist criticism and its attempt to reverse thecurrents
of power, making them flow again into religious circuits has, of course,
never left us, though it has recently been inflected through its intersections
with the conceptual geometry of corporate capitalism.
This is a story that needs to be told, and it is compellingly told with
clarity and erudition by Alain Cabantous. It is a story, however, that is here
incomplete. The central characters in Cabantous's account are institu
tional—^the churches, the states, the prosecutions, the defenders of the
sacred and the order of things. The dynamics of their practice were bound
up with the legal and conceptual determination and handling of blasphemy
on the part of those who claimed authority. Precious little is done here
with the blasphemous miscreants themselves and the way their words and
actions shaped, subverted, and transformed the conceptual and practical
order of the blasphemies they asserted. Cabantous's text is, in other words,
a valuable but nevertheless a one-sided history of blasphemy in the West
Completing the project and deepening its interpretive reflections will
contribute to our understanding of the development of the way power.
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language, and conceptions of the sacred have played intoour lives. May the
work be finished soon.

Edward Corp, with contributions by Edward Gregg,
Howard Erskine-Hill and Geoffrey Scott, A Court in
Exile: The Stuarts in France, 1689-1718. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2004. Pp. xvi + 386. $85.00.
Reviewed by Andrew Barclay, History of Parliament
Trust, London
Since the early 1990s Edward Corp has been publishing an impressive
number of articles, edited collections, and exhibition catalogues covering
all aspects of the Jacobite court at Saint-Germain-en-Laye. In the process
he has become the undisputed expert on the subject. Now he has
synthesixed that research into a single monograph. Others might have been
tempted to write the whole thing themselves, but Corp has always been
keen to work with others in the field and, in a characteristic act of
collaboration, he has now shared parts of that task with others. But it is
Corp himself who deserves thegreatest share of the considerable credit for
a book that can genuinely be described as "definitive."
From 1689 James II, his wife, Mary Beatrice of Modena, and a
number of their servants found themselves having to adjust to a life of
exile at the French court Louis XIV generously presented them with the
use of his chateau at Saint-Germain-en-Laye, a building which had until
recently been one of the major French royal palaces. There James and
Mary Beatrice set up a miniature version of the court they had presided
over in England. The temptation would be to view that court only as a
peripheral oddity on the f^ges of the court of the Sun King. Plenty of
historians in the past have done just that. But Saint-Germain was close to
Versailles and Marly and the regular visits to and from Louis XIV ensured
that the Stuarts and their courtiers were made to feel welcomed. A lavish
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pension from the French crown meant that in its heyday, between 1689
and 1712, the court at Saint-Germain maintained a suitably regal style.
James IPs household in the 1690s was larger, better funded and better
housed than that of his brother, Charles II, had been in the 1650s. But
English court etiquette was not the same as that of its French counterpart
and creating an English (or British) court within a French royal psdace
required adjustments. Corp is very good on how the physical layout of the
chateau dictated how it was used. His detailed discussion of who lived
where within the building can usefully be compared to the recent work of
a similar sort by Simon Thurley for Whitehall and Hampton Court and by
William Ritchey Newton for Versailles. This is all the more important as
the chateau, now the Musee des Antiquites Nationales, was much altered
in the nineteenth century.
Unsurprisingly, the culture of this court-within-a-court is a story of
mutual influence and interaction. The different facets of that culture
receive full attention. As he has done in the past, Corp writes with insight
on the subject of Jacobite portraiture. Images of James III (which is Corp's
preferred name for him) were a useful propaganda device, for, by showing
his striking family resemblance to his parents, these were the most effective
means of refuting the warming-pan fiction. The painters commissioned to
produce those images were mosdy French. This is therefore one example
of how the exiled Stuarts had littie choice but to accept and work within
the fashions of their hosts. But it was not alwa)rs so. Howard Erskine-Hill
contributes a fine chapter on how the poets in Jacobite court circles,
specifically Richard, Lord Maidand, Anthony Hamilton, Jane Barker, and
John CaryU, used verse as a medium for lamenting, if not quite coming to
terms with, James IPs fall and exile. Barker has received much deserved
attention in recent years, so it is useful to be reminded that she was not the
only person writing poetry in those circles. Written mosdy in English, their
poems, in so far as they had an intended readership at all, were aimed at
the Jacobite courtiers themselves and thus were not as engaged with the
wider cxilture of the French court around them as they might have been.
On the other hand, it was sometimes the Jacobite court that influenced
French tastes. Corp here restates his argument that James IPs musicians,
particularly his master of the music, Innocenzo Fede, made a discernable
impact on French musical fashions. That Fede was Italian, likeJames's wife
and a significant minority of their servants, underlines that there was a
third national component to these cultural interactions.
Other Jacobite influences were viewed by the French with more
suspicion, liie section by Geoffrey Scott on the education of the prince of
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Wales, the future James HI, particularly its account of his preceptor, John
Betham, brings out the complexity of the religious milieu around the exiled
Stunts. The court's reputation as a hotbed of Jansenism was, to a large
extent, well-deserved. Even worse (from the perspective of the French
government) was the number of Protestants at Saint-Germain. The
Jacobite court was Ae most conspicuous Protestant community in a
France that had supposedly been made safe for Catholicism. True, only a
minority of the servants in exile were Protestants, reversing the situation
in England where Catholics had only ever been an even smaller minority
in James IPs household. Those Protestants who had served him in
England do seem to have been more reluctant than the Catholics to follow
him to Saint-Germain. Some of them clearly did feel that they could be of
more use to him back home and the earliest Jacobite conspiracies in
England were mostly organised by Protestant ex-courtiers. Louis XIV's
determination to discourage a Protestant presence at Saint-Germain acted
as an added disincentive. Yet, as Corp shows, Louis's wishes conflicted
with James's deeply held Conviction that all Christian religions should be
tolerated. There can be no doubt that, given the chance,James would have
tolerated his Catholic and Protestant courtiers on as equal a basis as he had
done in England. His son was brought up to believe the same. It should
also be said that Geoffrey Scott's sensitive discussion of James IPs broader
religious beliefs is easily the best treatment of that subject yet written.
The book's final chapters trace the wretched tale of the slow decline
of the Jacobite community in and around Saint-Germain. The enduring
image of the Jacobite court there as a sad, impoverished backwater only
becomes true in the period after 1712, when James III had departed and
his sister, Louise-Marie, was dead. The death of Queen Mary Beatrice in
1718 brought about the court's formal dissolution. Yet the remaining
servants by then had few reasons to leave. They had been living there for
a generation, they had married into local , families, and they had children
who had known only exile. Few expected a second Stuart restoration in the
near future. Gradually, imperceptibly and perhaps reluctantly, they had
integrated into the local community. A handful of their descendents even
managed to hold on to their apartments within the chateau until after the
French Revolution.
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Eveline Cruickshanks and Howard Erskine-Hill, The
Atterhury Plot. Basingstoke and New York: Palgrave
Macmillan, 2004. Pp. xi + 312.12 illustrations. $68.00 .
Reviewedhy AnneBarheau Gardiner^ John Jay College,
CUNY
At last, a complete, thorougjily documented account of the Atterhury Plot
puts it beyond doubt that Bishop Francis Atterhury, a friend of Swift and
Pope, headed a majorJacobite plotin 1720-22. Eveline Cruickshanks (who
wrote chapters one to nine) and Howard Erskine-Hill (who wrote the
introduction, chapter ten, and the conclusion) demonstrate that Atterhury
worked steadily for around six years to bring in a Stuart restoration. The
Atterhury Plot is full of new evidence proving that in the wake of the South
Sea Bubble, George I came close to losing his crown. At the time, the earl
of Strafford assured the Regent of France that the nation was ten to one
against the Hanoverian. Some scholars contend that Walpole exaggerated
the Jacobite threat to consolidate Whig power, but in later conversations
decoded in the twentieth century, he declared that he always tookJacobites
to be a grave threat. The Stuart cause was far from hopeless when it could
attract such an eminent high-churchman as Atterhury. This book is a
thrilling account of the bishop's astonishingly bold management of a
Europe-wide conspiracy.
The Atterhury Plot came to a head at an auspicious moment when
there was universal anger against George I. The South Sea Company, of
which George was governor, had been expected to export nearly five
thousand African slaves a year to South America, but only one English
fleet at most was permitted to land annually. In 1720 South Sea stock rose
astronomically, then crashed in September, when it was realized that to pay
the dividends promised the Company would have to earn £15 million
yearly. In die ensuing crisis, fury against the court rose to such a pitch that
House Speaker Arthur Onslow observed that if the Stuart claimant could
have "landed at the Tower, he might have rode to St.James's with very few
hands held up against him" (61). When George returned from Hanover,
the public greeted him with ominous silence, and there was a sudden
demand for pictures of James and his queen from erstwhile hostile
aristocrats. The mood can be gauged by the Tory mob that came to the
London mayor's show shouting "A Stuart, a Stuart for ever." Tories now
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dominated London: "with the choice of two Tory sheriffs and a Tory lord
mayor, they were in a very strong position indeed" (76). But George had
the standing army, soldiers stowed in Ireland, Dutch troops on call by the
terms of the Barrier Treaties, and his own foreign mercenaries (47).
. To make hay of the South Sea fiasco, Jacobites distributed a
Declaration from James III announcing the birth of Prince rVmrlpc
Edward, reminding the English of the 1660 Restoration, and promising a
"free Parliament," i.e., one that was without bribery. George's minister
Sunderland wanted to promise freeelections too, but Walpole and the king
feared it would result in aTory parliament and a constitutional restoration.
That same year, Jacobites issued the Unica Salus medal with a profile of
James on one side, and on the other Britannia weeping over London, with
a Hanoverian horse trampling the British lion. A tract also appeared
accusing George of selling a vast amount of South Sea stock in the interest
of Hanover, though the evidence—the "Green Book" in which Robert
Knight had listed the names of those who received ^(800,000 in unpaid
stock to facilitate the scheme—^was missing. It was said that George had
accepted ,(50,000 in stock, sold it, and transferred the money to Hanover.
In 1721, he signed a Bill of Indemnity to protect those accused of receiving
free stock.
Discontent with the regime was not new, but it had never been so
widespread. From his accession in 1714, George had trusted only Whigs
and driven Tories from national and local office and firom the upper ranks
of the military. Resentment over his one-party rule led to the Swedish Plot
in 1716-17, the Spanish Plot in 1719, and the Atterbury Plot in 1720-22.
As early as 1716, Atterbury—a favorite of the lower clergy—^received full
authority to raise money and act for James. Every subsequent move at
restoration had to receive the bishop's approval. It was Atterbury who
persuaded Ormonde—a popular Tory, Chancellor of Oxford, and the only
Protestant duke in Ireland—to go abroad and work for a Stuart restora
tion. Ormonde became Captain-General of the Spanish armies, obtained
pensions and army commissions for Jacobites, and in 1719 sailed with
troops for Britain, but his fleet was foiled by a storm at sea.
In the run-up to the Atterbury Plot, John Law, a Jacobite Scotsman,
gave vast sums to the Stuart cause. He had become the virtual first minister
of France by restoring credit to a government loaded with war debts. After
setting up the Banque Generale—which by 1717 was such a strong
institution, its notes were national currency—^Law took charge of the tax
system, foreign trade, and the Mississippi Company (which was developing
part of the American South and controlled the French companies for
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Africa and the Far East). In 1720 a run on his bank ruinedJohn Law. After
that, another setback occurred when George made an alliance with Spain
and France in 1721 to stop them from aiding Jacobites. Yet the rimp was
still auspicious for a restoration: Atterbury assured James III, on 22 April
1721; that they needed little assistance from abroad, and Sir Henry Goring
wrote to Ormonde that as few as 1,000 soldiers with 10,000 arms would
suffice, since both Whigs and Tories craved a reprieve.
The key players of the Plot were members of the opposition in
Parliament who met in Cowper's Cabal and Orrery's Club. The Cabal
published The Freeholder, which recorded signed protests against the votes
won by the government. Some—^like Cowper, Bathurst, Orrery, Strafford,
North and Grey,Scarsdale, and Atterbury himself—were members of both
clubs. Other key players were the Earl of Arran (Ormonde's brother).
Baron Lansdowne, Viscount Dillon, and the Earl of Mar. Lansdowne
directed Jacobite propaganda from abroad; Dillon, who had forfeited his
estates in Ireland in 1692, was a general in the French army; Mar, who had
led 20,000 Scots in the 1715 rebellion, was greatly esteemed in exile, but he
would give Walpole the code names he used to convict Atterbury. Still
another major figure in the Plot was the lawyer Christopher Layer, who
delivered to James III in 1721 the crucial 'Tist" of the lords in each county
willing to support a Stuart restoration. The British government never got
a copy of this "List," arguably the most important item in the Stuart
papers. In thanks, James and his queen became godparents to Layer's child.
The rising was planned for early autumn 1722, when the army would
be withdrawn from the constituencies for the election. In the final, most
daring phase of the Plot, Jacobites recruited soldiers, sailors, and guards
from George's service, including sixty of the 2nd Tower Guard. These
recruits were urged to go hear Henry Sacheverell preach at St Andrew's,
Holborn! Also recruited were Minters (debtors driven by the South Sea
crash to take refuge in Southwark), Waltham Blacks (smugglers of brandy),
and Thames watermen. Meanwhile, recruits from Ireland streamed into
Spain, more than enough for two battalions,and Scotland promised 20,000
men. James Ill's ships were ready to sail from Spain with 400 Jacobite
officers and English crews. They were to capture London first, where a
third of the aldermen and over half the Common Council were thought
favorable. Sweden was to provide arms and ships, and, till James arrived,
a Council of Regency consisting of Ormonde, Arran, Strafford, Oxford,
Orrery, Atterbury, Gower, North and Grey, and Lansdowne would govern.
But it was not to be. By the start of 1722, the Plotters had only half
the money needed to buy arms. They had raised the huge sum of £200,000,
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but it was not enough. Atterbury was still safe, but only as long as
Sunderland, the rival of Walpole, lived (for in his final year, Sunderland was
sympathetic to the Tories). After he died, Walpole struck: that summer he
announced publicly that an Association signed by many great npbles on
behalf of the "Pretender" had been discovered and that there was enough
evidence toexecute a hundred persons of distinction.TheJacobites burned
their papers—^Atterbury, those of the past decade, others, of 1720-22.
Then on 25 August 1722, the bishop was arrested for treason and put in
solitary confinement in the Tower. Yet public prayers were offered for him
in most churches of London and Westminster. Walpole imposed a new tax
of £100,000 on Catholics to build up the army. When the Catholic kings
of Europe protested, he told their envoys this was a warning to them not
to help Ae 'Tretender." The tax became law in 1723.
Now the trials began. Christopher Layer took the blame for the Plot
on himself, was tried for treason in October 1722, and hanged and
quartered at Tyburn. He refused mercy rather than testify against Atter
bury. In Spring 1723, the bishop was tried on a "bill of pains and penal
ties," not treason, because Walpole had little evidence against him.
In a gripping scene at the trial, Alexander Pope appeared as a
character witness. The poet was terribly flustered, for he knew himself to
be in jeopardy: some relatives (of the Rackett family) and a friend (of the
Caryll family) had been involved in the plot. Besides, Walpole knew of his
role in publishing Buckingham's works, which contained passages
ridiculing the 1689 settlement. In letters written at the time. Pope showed
that he regarded Atterbury as a hero like Cicero, Bacon, and Clarendon,
one suffering undeserved disgrace. The bishop surely rejoiced that the
greatest poet of the age was on his side. Neither regarded it as treason to
correspond with James III, and this was demonstrated in Pope's moving
epitaph for Atterbury in 1732, where he attributed to him this dyingprayer:
"Save my Country, Heav'n." Pope was saying that Atterbury's essential
character had always been that of a true Englishman.
The evidence against the bishop was this: the unsigned examination
of Reverend Philip Neynoe, now deceased, and threeletters in cipher. The
letters had supposedly been sent by the Post Office, but Jacobites never
used the Post Office. In one letter, Atterbury had allegedly written that his
wife was upset about a "lame dog," but by the date of that letter she had
died. Thomas Hearne thought the letters forged, but the code names
accurate, perhaps because Mar had informed Walpole about them. In a
speech deemed worthy of Cicero, Atterbury complained that he had not
been allowed "to examine the decypherers concerning the rules by which
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they discovered the pretended meaningof theletters" and that these letters
bore "all the marks of fraud and contrivance" (215). His friend Swift would
rise to his defense in Part Three of Gulliver's Travels (1726) and ridictile the
use of decipherers in state trials, referring explicitly to Atterbury's trial by
the example of a lam dog:
After the bishop was condemned to exile, collections were made (in
which Sacheverell was active) that raised £16,000. Atterbury sailed oh 18
June 1723, leaving Orrery to replace him as Jacobite leader. Despite the
failure of the Atterbury Plot, Orrery said that four out of five in Britain still
wished James III well, but they feared to venture their lives and estates.
Atterbury would decline to beJames Ill's secretary of state, yet he showed
eagerness in 1725 to exploit the alliance of Bourbon Spain and the
Hapsburg Empire for the Stuart cause. This lively, well-researched book
reveals Atterbury to have been a bishop cast in the same mold as Laud and
Sancroft—fiercely committed to the Church of England and also true to
the hereditary Stuart line. Like those prelates, he was learned, high-church,
and amazingly bold in his politics.
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Francis Hutcheson, An Inquiry into the Original of Our
Ideas of Beauty and Virtue. Ed. Wolfgang Leidhold.
Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 2004. Pp. xxvii + 258. $20.00
(hardcover); $12.00 (paperback). Hutcheson, An Essay
on the Nature and Conduct of the Passions and Affec
tions, with Illustrations on the Moral Sense. Ed. Aaron
Garrett. Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 2002. Pp. xxv + 226.
$20.00 (hardcover); $12.00 (paperback).
Reviewed hy Thomas Mautner, Australian National
University
Why read Hutcheson? Most students know of him vaguely, mainly as a
precursor of Hume. "There is litde or nothing in Hume's moral philosophy
that cannot be traced to Hutcheson, but in Hume it is all more clear and
pointed,"wrote Arthur Prior in 1949 (J^gk and the Basis of Ethics, 31). Many
important strands of Hutcheson's thought do recur in Hume: his defence
of the new theory of a moral sense and his rejection of rationalist theories
of ethics, for instance, which, having quickly provoked objections fcom
John Clarke,John Balguy and Gilbert Burnet, led to many of the revisions
introduced in later editions of these two works. (The present text-Critical
editions make it possible for the first time to view these changes synoptically.) But Hutcheson's work explores other topics, many of them
interesting in their own tight, all of them of historical interest
His centralidea is that we have,in addition to the five external senses,
also a sense of beauty and a moral sense. These senses were introduced in
Inquiry (the two main parts of which, published in 1725, will be referred to
as T1 and T2). Over time, the number of senses grew, among them, in
Esscy (also in two parts [1728]; T3 and T4), the public sense and the sense
of honor. Experiences conveyed by these senses determine us, he argued,
to judge things good or bad, and to decide for or against a course of action,
without regard to self-interest: this anti-egoism mattered most to him.
Hutcheson explores other matters too, of course, in these important
volumes. Morals mthoutfaith. He disputes the thesis that every action is a sin
if it is undertaken without considering God. It would have the repugnant
consequence that "the best of men are infinitely evil" (T4: 6.1,187). The
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problem of evil. He also argues that contemplating the natural world will lead
us to belief in a benevolent God. "How can anyone...even question a
perfecdy good Providence?" (T3:6.3-4). Moral matters: the "conduct of the
passions and affections" (roughly: the emotions and desires) covers a wide
range, some of which, like his condemnation of the character traits Hume
later described as the "monkish virtues," seems now mainly of historical
interest Others, for example those concerning honor killings and the sense
of honor generally (T3: 5.8), have gained renewed relevance. Beauty: He
insists, in Inquiry^ on the beauty of the theorems and theories (Tl: 3)
offered by the deductive sciences (mathematics, physics), a kind of beauty
neglected by all subsequent writers on aesthetics. (He also mentioned
natural law theory like PufendorPs, but omitted this in the fourth edition
of Tl.) Hutcheson also maintained that our delight at the works of nature
is at least equal to, or else greater than, that inspired by works of art (13:
6.2,115).
Like other Liberty Fund publications, these volumes are elegantly
designed, excellently produced, and moderately priced. To handle and read
them is a pleasure. Both the cover of Inquiry and the editor's introduction
to Essay describe these volumes as "variorum" editions. But an edition of
a classical work mm notis variorum is one which includes annotations and
comments by other writers, usually previous editors of the same work.
That description does not fit the present volumes. The editorial input is in
many respects commendable, though closer inspection reveals certain
imperfections.
The two volumes are text-critical. Leidhold records variations
between the four editions of Inquiry published in Hutcheson's life
time—1725, 1726, 1729 and 1738—and labels them A, B, C, and D
respectively. He has also noted differences between three different versions
dated 1738 (Dl, D2 and D3). While he thanks Luigi Turco (xxvii) for
communicating relevant information about this, he ignores Turco's
"Sympathy and Moral Sense," British Journal for the History of Phihsoply 1
(1999): 79-101, which shows how later editions of Inquiry vjcxit revised in
order to meet objections (Hutcheson himself mentioned diis in the 1742
edition of Essay) especially by John Clarke and Archibald Campbell, who
insisted on the primacy of self-interest. Leidhold's survey of editions has
problems, however. Leidhold repeats Turco's statement that Dl, except
for a new tide-page, is identical to C, but as Christoph Fehige has shown
(in volume 13 [2005] of the same journal), there are many diffetences
between Dl and C. Nor has Leidhold noted that there are three variants
of A: the bibliography in Hutcheson, On Human Nature (Cambridge^
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University Press, 1993), lists two variants of A under the heading 1725(A)
and one under 1725(B). Also mentioned there, but omitted by Leidhold,
is the pamphlet, listing changes introduced in B, that was published for the
benefit of those who shortly before had spent money on A. In the present
edition, B is used as the copy-text, but no reason for this choice is given.
A distinctive feature of A's earliest variants is the title-page advertise
ment, which states that the work (1) defends Shaftesbury's principles (2)
against Mandeville's Fable of the Beer, that it (3) explains the ideas of moral
good and evil according to the sentiments of the ancient moralists; and that
it (4) attempts to introduce mathematics into moral subjects. Leidhold
notes (199) that this advertisement was omitted from B, C, and D, but it
was actually omitted earlier: it is absent already in 1725(B), the later variant
of A. As for chronology, A was published in March 1725, the preface for
B was dated June 1725, and B was in fact published in October 1725,
although it carried the imprint 1726. So the advertisement's life-span was
a matter of months. This tells against Stephen Darwall's suggestion in
British Moralists and the Internal
(Cambridge University Press, 1995;
209) that Hutcheson dropped the advertisement because he later moved
away from Shaftesbury's theory, a suggestion based on the incorrect
assumption that it was first omitted in C, some four years later. With the
benefit of a text-critical edition errors of this nature are more easily
avoided.
As regards Essay, Garrett accounts for two variants of the first edition
1728 (lA, IB), one second edition of 1730, and a third of 1742. He
explains his reasons for preferring lA as a copy-text, and notes that the
1730 text reissues it and that the many textual changes in the 1742 edition
are recorded in endnotes, which indicate the correlated word or passage in
the main text In the main text, however, no marks indicate the presence
of a correlated endnote, an inconvenience that would be non-existent if
footnotes had been used.
Garrett notes that the 1730 edition has Hutcheson's name and
"Professor of Moral Philosophy in the University of Glasgow"[etc] on the
title-page. But copies also exist (Dr. Williams's Library, Bodleian Library)
with the 1730 date and the usual anonymous title-page. So it was the new
tide-page, rather than the reissueitself, that aimed "to boost sales by meang
of Hutcheson's newly acquired academic distinction" (xx). The existence
of this reissue was not recorded in the above-mentioned bibliography,
which does, on the other hand, record a 1742 issue with an appendix,
absent from the 1742 issue used by the editor.
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In both volumes, endnotes indicate deviations from the copy-text in
the other editions. Footnotes would have been easier, as in Peter Nidditch's masterly edition of Locke's Esst^ Concerning Human Understanding
(Clarendon Press,1975). One interesting pattern becomes clearly visible in
the apparatus to Inquiry: the tendency to replace emotive notions with
volitional ones as when "delight" is replaced by "desire," "love" by "good
will," or with intellectual ones, with 'love" replaced by "approbation,"
"hate" by "disapprove," all symptoms of a significant revision of the
theory. In Essay the changes are less radical. There are, however, problems
with the apparatus in Inquiry, identified in the article by Fehige mentioned
above, which are significant enough to raise doubts whether this edition,
while adequate for general purposes of study, can be relied on for research
purposes.
Both editors supply introductions. They are quite short, no doubt in
accordance with editorial policy for the series. Leidhold sums up some
leading theses in Hutcheson, but gives too much space to political matters
that are marginal in the text, and does not analyze the theoretical shift
evidenced by the later texmal variants. Garrett is more informative,
reminding us that the Presbyterians were dissenters in Ireland but
constituted the Established Church in Scotland, sketching the historical
setting, and introducing the critics to whom Essey offered replies.
Leidhold supplies a list of thirty-three items of references and further
reading. Only three of them have a date of first publication later than 1990.
Among items not listed are two important papers by Turco (1968, 1999)
and the translations of Inquiry by Bdmes into French (1991) and by Lupoli
into Italian (2000), both containing a wealth of notes and comments. Nor
is there any mention of On Human Nature (1993), which contains Hutcheson's preview of Inquiry in the London Journal (November 1724). No similar
complaints can be directed against the Essay edition; it has no bibliography
at all.
The index for Inquiry rmsses out on Turco, on the names in the
original title-page advertisement, and on a fair number of other items. The
index for Essay is much less satisfactory. Leaving aside the choice and
indexing of subject-headings, which is always debatable, the indexing of
names is totally inadequate. At least thirty-five proper names are entirely
missing from the index. Among them are Aristotle (mentioned in the text
in at least 7 places), Hobbes (6), Horace (11), Plato (6). At least fourteen
names are only partly indexed: Malebranche (5 loci; another 3 missing),
Pufendorf (2; 2), Shaftesbury (2; 8). Lucretia occurs in the index, but not
Lucretius.
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A good copy-editor would have imposed a consistent format of
references to works by classical and early-modern authors; would have
ensured that the running-heads in Essay, like those in Inquiry, indicate part
and section so that one knows what one is reading; would have moved the
editorial foomote at p. 10 of Esscy to its proper place at p. 206; and would
have rejected a number of editorial notes (e.g. Essay, 97) that complain that
Hutcheson gives incorrect references to sections in Inquiry. These
complaints overlook that some section numbers in Inquiry changed
between editions. Even Hutcheson himself would have needed a copyeditor: in the first edition of Inquiry, he overlooked that his enumeration of
the senses in the numbered, marginal subheadings of T3, Section 4omitted
the one for the moral sense (75) and left the following ones unnumbered.
Neither he nor later editors ever corrected this.
The editors explain well many aspects of the content and the allusions
in the texts. But at times one wishes to demur. Leidhold states (12) that
among the ancients, Hutcheson was familiar with Plato, Aristotle, Cicero
and probably Plotinus. This, while true, is misleading, since he was
conversant with many more of the ancient philosophers, historians, and
poets. Again, Hutcheson,in arguing his case against egoism, compares (93)
our attimde to a few persecuted ingenious artisans, refugees on oiu: shores,
whose skills and industry have gready benefited our country, with our
attitude to the resolute burgomasters who have successfully cast off the
yoke of tyranny in a neighbouring country and entered into serious
commercial competition with us. An editorial explanation of the allusions
would be useful, and while Leidhold explains the first allusion, to the
Dutch uprising against Spain, he leaves the second, to the Huguenot
refugees, unexplained. Similarly, " a later author" (113) is helpfully
identified as Mandeville, but "another sophist" and "some of our philoso
phers" (113), "the opinions of our country are by some made the first
standard ofvirme" (151), "the writers upon opposite schemes" (180), and
others remain unidentified. Other notes seem less than accurate. The
position of Cumberland as friend or foe remains unclear. Hobbes is said
to hold that all moral qualities are necessarily related to the law of a
superior (86), which sounds dubious.
Similar problems occur in the editorial matter in Essay. Garrett writes
(xiv) that Bayle, like Locke, viewed sanctions as the basic support of
morality, which also sounds dubious. As for missing explanations, surely
the reference to"ovir DistressedMother" (T3:3.5,60) needs one. Few readers
will know that this was Ambrose Philips's adaptation of Racine's Andromaque. The Greek quotations have some misprints, and like the Latin ones.
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the quality of translation is uneven and in one instance clearly wrong
(Horace contrasts Greek and Roman, the translation at p. 70 does not).
And translating Fiatjustitia as "Do what is right" (98) is problematic. "Let
justice be done" or "Let there be justice" would be better. Even in moral
contexts, rigjitness is a wider notion than justice. In quite a few places,
Hutcheson's own classical quotations differ from what is now accepted as
the best text. For example, scholars preferpotestas ^ower) in Lucretius II,
53 rather than Hutcheson's egestas (indigence). Such discrepancies have not
been annotated. These are misgivings over particular points and should not
overshadow the fact that the editorial input is on the whole of great value.
In summary, the editing of these two volumes is flawed on many
points of detail. The text-critical apparams in the Inquiry volume has
shortcomings such that, for research purposes, it would be unwise to rely
on it. Still, for the first time in about 250 years, Hutcheson's most
important works are readily and attractively accessible. The two volumes
will be of benefit to students, and, imperfections notwithstanding, much
credit is due to the editors, the series editor (Knud Haakonssen), and
Liberty Fund.

*

Raymond Stephanson, TBe Yard of Wit: Male Creativ
ity and Sexuality, 1650-1750. Philadelphia: University
of Pennsylvania Press, 2004. Pp. xv + 292. $55.00.
Reviewed by Laura Rosenthal, University of Maryland,
College Park
Raymond Stephanson's Yard of Wit explores the changing meaning of the
penis in the long eighteenth century—^not the symbolic phallus but the
physical organ, its different states of being, and its significance to
masculinity and male authorship in particular. Stephanson argues that by
placing so much emphasis on the phallus, feminist and psychoanalytic
critics have overlooked the ways in which the penis itself bears different
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kinds of meaning at different moments in history. While the phallus
implies patriarchal power, the humbler yard tends instead to function as a
site of conflict, vulnerability, identity formation, and creativity. In
eighteenth-century literature, Stephanson's work suggests, sometimes a
penis is just a penis.
The relationship between female bodies and women's creativity has
been studied extensively; the specific masculinity of male authorship,
however, has been generally overlooked. Stephanson thus begins by
suggesting that masculine identity in general, but also male creativity in
particular, became associated with the yard in this period in new and more
prominent ways. Stephanson explores a wide range of analogies between
the head and the groin that suggest this. In some figures, the greatness of
one indicates the limits of the other, but in other places genius can be
figured as virility. Thesecond chapter argues that in metaphorical, but even
sometimes in literal ways, the penis was separated from the male body and
commodified during this period. Instead of locating male value in the
entire body, as perhaps would an era that equated birth and worth, value
becomes distributed into parts. The penis as an independent entity
becomes a subject of public discussion in a range of locations, from
controversies over the castratti to poems about Charles II's pintle to
medical treatises to pornography.
The emergent division of the body into parts, however, produced "a
traffic in the new rhetoric of masculinity/creativity-as-male-embodiment"
when it dovetailed with the literary marketplace, the subject of the third
chapter. The literal and figurative connections between heads and groins
became marketable tropes, rhetorical commodities whose sexual redefini
tions of male authorship also helped to sell books in a capitalist printculture. Thus authorship became particularly sexualixed for men in this
period, a configuration that offered numerous humiliating tropes as points
of attack. Often, however, male authors themselves turned to sexualixed
images of creativity as a form of empowerment: "the discourse of
reproductive labor.. .could in some ways serve to redeem authorship from
the lower-order materiality of money, objects, and traffic" (97). Particular
images of glorious literary phallicism emerge during this period as a
"counter-thrust" to the degrading representation of the male writer as
prostitute. Stephanson details fouranalogies of male creativity as sexualixed
reproduction, from the noble to the grotesque: the immaculate patriarchal
birth of male genius, the metaphor of male full-body birth giving male
poets "all the physical accoutrements of gestation," creativity as metaphori
cally female reproduction, and authorship as male anal birth. Male
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authorship was not only sexualked through metaphors of birth, but also
through particular eighteenth-century manifestations of the classical
relationship between a man and his female muse, a figure that became in
this period highly erotici2ed. Classical poets influenced eighteenth-century
writers in their construction of authorship-as-birth metaphors; neverthe
less, Stephanson argues, these figures themselves become vexed in the
collision between private creativity and the public world of printers,
booksellers, and readers.
Stephanson's argument becomes most compelling in the last chapter,
which offers an extended reading of the career of Alexander Pope in light
of the eighteenth-century reconceptuali2ation of the penis. Pope's
combination of great ambition and physical disability, as well as his
particular importance in the history of male authorship, make him the
touchstone in this smdy throughout. In "Eloisa to Abelard," Stephanson
observes, Pope's female impersonation "in which a woman-as-poet figure
searches in vain for the yard or a male sexuality which is already absent,
reflects [Pope's] sense of the inadequacy of pen and poetry as substitutes
for the phallus and a male body of fleshy desire" (172). The penis also
becomes central in the period's disputes over literary values, in which Pope
figured prominently. Drawing on earlier discussions of popular eighteenthcentury analogies between the yard and the cranium, Stephanson describes
how Pope's "head" became a marketable commodity in his battles with
CurU. Not surprisingly. Pope's body emerges as a point of vtilnerability and
an opportunity for attack by his critics, but Stephanson uses this to suggest
a particular form of male vulnerability in general. In a closing discussion of
the crude but fascinating invectives between Pope and Gibber, Stephanson
gives Gibber due credit for perceptively exploiting cultural analogies
between the penis and creativity.
The implication of Stephanson's work—and I'm extending the
argunaent a bit here—^is that feminist arguments in some ways defeat
themselves by focusing so much attention on the phallus, a strategy that
grants more power to males than they have actually possessed. (Of course,
psychoanalysis denies that real men possess phallic power, but the general
phallus/power association has nevertheless been criticized as a patriarchal
construction.) But while Stephanson himself eschews phallic readings, his
study also draws to a large extent on cultural representations—symbolic,
literary, and tropological penises rather than only historical ones. I point
this out not as criticism, but to suggest that his approach might have more
in common with feminist ones than he acknowledges, undermining his
overstressed point that critics have avoided discussing the penis due to
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embarrassment. Even before psychoanalysis the penis functioned as a
political tool, but literally and symbolically. Also, it might have been helpful
if Stephanson had explored other literary texts with the same care he
devotes to Pope's writing so we could see the broader implications of his
insights and research moreimmediately. Stephanson mentions the opening
scene of The Country Wife for its discussion of Horner's penis, but really the
entire plot hangs on this organ. Does the argument about the commodificadon of the penis have implicadons for Tom Jones's prostitution to Lady
Bellaston? More space could have been made for literary readings if some
of the other material had been presented more economically.
Nevertheless, Stephanson fruitfully prompt us to rethink the
fundamental representational relationship between the penis and power,
which some feminist criticism has indeed taken as monolithic The Yard of
Wit demonstrates the centraUty of the penis and penis images to
eighteenth-century writing, it shows continuities between high culture and
pornography in the conceptualization of male creativity as sexual, and it
suggests intriguing ways in which males and their penises were imagined
to be often at odds with each other. The accumulation of detail about the
eighteenth-century penis that Stephanson has gathered, while not
immediately self-explanatory, leads to important reconsiderations of the
construction of masculinity and male authorship in the eighteenth century.

Alexander Pettit and Patrick Spedding, eds., EighteenthCentury British Erotica 11. 5 vols. London: Pickering &
Chatto, 2004. Pp. xxviii + 523, xiv + 343, xviii + 396, xviii
+ 415, xxiii + 424. $675.00.
Reviewed by George Haggertyy University of Califor
nia, Riverside
This impressive collection of facsimile materials is organized in five
volumes. Volume One covers the years 1700—35 and is edited by Janine
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Barcas; volume two, 1735—50, is edited by Deborah Needleman Armintor;
volume three, 1751—1800, by Kevin L. Cope; volume four, TAe Prostitute's
Ufe: Saiy Salisbury and Fanny Hill, is edited by Lena Olsson; and volume
five. Sodomites, Mollies, Sapphists, and Tommies, is edited by Rictor Norton.
In his engaging "General Introduction" to this collection, Alexander
Pettit suggests that the material collected in these volumes reveals "a whiff
(so to speak) of discontent with the dominant literary culture. At a time
when the novel and other forms chose to regard empiricism as the
philosophical basis of sentient, motivated, and psychological character,
one-offs like Arse Musica [vol. 1] were content to hang fire in the zone of
simple experience, relishing without resonance the biophysical stimuli that
undergird, say, the Richardson novel or the pre-Romantic poem" (1: x—xi).
Another way to put this would be to say that this material represents the
"Reality TV" of the eighteenth century. Thumbing its nose at respectable
literary production, if it notices that world at all, this material reaches out
to its audience in a visceral, anti-intellectual way. As a result it is popular
in a way that more formal fictions could never be.
The materials in volume one include such things as The Benefit of
Farting Explain'd; or. The Fundamental-All Cause of the Distempers Incident to the
Fair Sex Inquir'd Into (1722); The Harlot's Progress: or, The Humours of Druiy
hane (1732); ixidi An Essay upon Improving and Adding, to the Strength of GreatBritain andlreland, ly Fornication (1735). Recent work on pamphlet literature,
by Sally O'Driscoll and others, suggests that by ignoring material such as
this we have skewed the histories of gender and sexuality, and a study of
these materials makes it clear what a useful corrective this is. There is
nothing profound about this material, but it amplifies our understanding
of the age, and it fills out our notions of gender embodiment and sexual
behavior in fascinating ways.
The Harlot's Progress, for instance, in its attempt to narrate Hogarth's
series of engravings, which are included here as well, gives us the attitude
of the harlot herself, who, rather than an object of pity or disgust becomes
a defiant subject:
When Huckahout had fully weigh'd
The value of her Maidenhead,
Its Plague to keep, its Weight to bear.
And how she often to a Hair
Was forc'd to manage it, to keep it.
When it was ever so intrepid;
Pox on't, said she (an ugly Curse,
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And by the way 'twas ominous.
As she and many-a-one have felt,
;
Who wish in youth they had been gelt)
- Pox on't, said she,'t has leant to eat,
' And now I'll make it earn,its meat;
This blust'ring, hect'ring Colonel Bully
Shall not be long my only Cully. (231)
I suppose this version of female agency is nothing to be celebrated, but still
it is worth considering next to that Pamela, Cecilia, and even Moll. Voices
like this need to be heard and to be accounted for if we are to claim that
we understand how gender functioned in the period.
The second volume begins with the bawdy and amusing Kick Him
Nan (or, a Poetical Description of the Wedding Night) and Kick Him Jenny
(a Tale), in the latter of which the heroine laments: "For Heav'n's Sake,
Roger, let me go; / I do believe you are—oh! / That you are—oh! are
oh?—are true—/ O lud!—what do you mean to do? / I'm sure you're—
oh! are true enough, / You've given me—oh!—sufficient Proof—/ Bless
me!—^indeed—^To-morrow you—/ Whate're you please—shall do, iih, uh,
/1vow you shall—-upon my—^Life, /And I'll content—to be your—Wife"
(30). In addition to such evocative material—where else in the eighteenth
century is orgasm written out in this way?—^this volume includes the first
material of a non-Western guise: A.Chinese Tale, written Ori^nally ly that Trior
ofChina, The Facetious Sou maQuan^ A Celebrated Mandarin of Letters; under the
Title of Chamyam Tcho Chang. Or Chamyam with her leg upon a Table. The
accompanying engraving looks so little Chinese that the charm of the tale
is in the title. Indeed, the poem announces after a few dozen lines, "in
every Age, in every Clime, / Quite down to us from Adam's time. Woman
is Woman, and all have / This Leaven of their Mother Fvd' (207). The
briefest description of a Chinese palace allows the author to create the
scene described in the introduction. Historians of pornography might see
works like this as the beginning of a vogue for Asian motifs in erotica! In
this case, however, the erotics are as Western as those represented
elsewhere in the collection.
Volume Three offers erotic material from the second half of the
eighteenth century, and the absence of Asian topics is at least partly made
up by a sound attack on Roman Catholic priests {Memoirs of the Voluptuous
Conduct of the Capuchini) and colonial suggestions of the Heroic Epistle, from
Roger Sugar-Cane, Knt. and Bart, to Lat^ Maria C—n—y, Priestess Elect in the
Cyprian Temple. The latter work, as Kevin L. Cope describes it, "is built
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around the old legend that the island of Cyrus, to which Sir Roger SugarCane invites Lady C—n—y, was sacred to Aphrodite, the goddess of
love, and therefore a haven for all things erotic, including strapping young
lads eager to service mature women. To this, the poem adds a modern-day
colonial ambiance through imaginary sugar-cane studded pleasure isles"
(297-98).
In the fourth volume, John Cleland's Memoirs of a Woman of Pleasure
(1750) is reprinted along with The Genuine History of Mrs. Sally Prydden,
Usually Called Saiy Salisbury, and Her Gallants (1723), which is "based on the
life of a real person" (vii), according to Lena Olssen, the editor of this
volume. I have to ask whether it is necessary to reprint a work that has for
some time been available in an Oxford World's Classic paperback and if
there were not some other "whore biographies" with which to fill out the
volume. The Sal^ Salisbury biography is itself rich and suggestive in ways
that Fanty Hill is not, and it would be fascinating to see several such
documents that are unknown, rather than Cleland's text, which is almost
too well known. Be that as it may, this volume is beautifully produced, and,
as I say, Sal^ Salisbury is a fascinating document from the zgc of Defoe.
The final volume, edited by Rictor Norton, is an especially welcome
one-volume collection of many of the most important documents
concerning same-sex desire and gender transgression, to the degree that
they are ever clearly distinguished, throughout the century. If this were
available as a single-volume publication, I would put it on the required
reading list for many of the courses I teach. A list of the contents will
remind many scholars working in the field of reading lists that had to be
cobbled together from a variety of sources. It's wonderful to have them all
together here: Tunbridge Walks; or, the Yeoman of Kent (1703); The WomanHater's Lamentation (1707); The He-Strumpets; A Satyr on the Sodomite Club
(1707; 1710); The Play of Sodom, A Tragerty (1707); Love-Letters betrveen a
CertainLateNoblemanandtheFamousBeauWilson (1123); ThePrettyGentleman:
or Softness of Manners Vindicated(1747); Sodom and Onan. A Satire (1116); and
many other tides. There are two or three female-oriented works, including
A New Ballad (1708); An Epistle from Signora F——a to a La^ (1727); and
A Se^hick Epistle,fromJack Cavendish to theHonourable andMostBeautifulMrs.
D**** (1778?), and their inclusion seems like an afterthought here. That is
surely how the introduction reads. It is a shame that the editors could not
find someone doing lesbian history to construct some materials to
complement the rich list of moUy and sodomite material. At the very least,
something like Henry Fielding's The Female Husband (1746) could start to
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suggest that there was a similar complexity of alternatives among women
as among men.
I am nevertheless pleased to be in the position to praise this project
and to suggest that the usefulness of this material is just beginning to be
understood. If we remember when work by Alan Bray and Randolph
Trumbach got us to look seriously at some of this material, and if we
consider how much the "history of sexuality" has been affected as a result,
then we can only look with pleasure at a publication like this one to
imagine how once again the field will change because of the material
generally available for study. The publication of this collection, along with
the first series, is a cause for celebration for all of us working in the
eighteenth century. We can congratulate the editors for gathering this
material and congratulate aU those working in the history of gender and
sexuality: this publication surely marks a coming of age.

¥

Elise Goodman, ed., Art and Culture in the Eighteenth
Century: New Dimensions and Multiple Perspectives.
Newark: University of Delaware Press, 2001. Pp.158.44
illustrations. $52.50.
Reviewed by Anne Betty Weinshenker, Montclair State
University
In her preface to the nine essays in this volume, Elise Goodman correctly
emphasizes the broad diversity that they represent. The book offers an
extensive range of topics and a variety of approaches to its unifying core,
which consists primarily of smdies in the paintiag and to a lesser degree the
printmaking of the eighteenth century. The contents and orientations of
the articles extend in many directions firom that core, their only other
unifying bond being the amorphous term "culture." So it is that subjects
as varied as the aesthetic theory of Du Bos, a spurious biography of
Madame de Pompadour, and misconceptions about Fragonard's reputation
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are included, along with interpretations of works by Hogarth, Reynolds,
and Wright of Derby. The compilation's geographic spread includes France
(three articles), Italy (one article), and England (four articles), all countries
whose artistic production is acknowledged as vital and influential in the
western world during this period. One of its essays focuses on Spanish art
of the time, to which much less attention has hiAerto been devoted.
John C. O'Neal's essay, "Nature's Culture in Du Bos's 'BJJkxions
critiques sur la poesie et sur la peinture" underlines this.landmark text's
advocacy of artistic judgment based on theinstincts and experience of a lay
public rather than the rationalist rules of professionals. The importance of
this shift was noted as far back as Albert Dresdner's Die Entstehung der
Kunstkritik of 1915, but O'Neal examines Du Bos's text more extensively,
pointing out that he is concerned with the creation as well as the reception
of works of art, including exploration of the concept of genius. He also
relates the Reflexions critiques to the sensationist epistemology of the time
and to a democratization of taste that is ultimately consonant with
contemporary social and political trajectories.
The volume's second essay, "The Longest-Enduring Pompadour
Hoax: Senac de Meilhan and the Journal de Madame du Hausset," by Alden
R. Gordon, deals with a purported collection of memoirs by a chamber
maid to the royal mistress. Displaying scrupulously attentive scholarly
research, Gordon reveals that its actual author is probably Gabriel Senac
de Meilhan, an emigre living in Vienna after the Revolution. Gordon's
expose of this influential text is a fascinating exercise in document
authentication, but appears to be appropriately included in Goodman's
collection only by virtue of the permeable boundaries of the term
"culture." The essay contains no reference to Pompadour's connections
with art, as subject, practitioner, or patron; it appears to assume the
reader's acquaintance with the subject.
Anne L. Schroder's study, "Reassessing Fragonard's Later Years: The
Artist's Nineteenth-Century Biographers, the Rococo, and the French
Revolution," also revisits long-accepted notions concerning a major figure
of the century, in this case the artistJean-Honore Fragonard. Drawing on
a large number of sources outside of official government and Academy
documents, she proves that in the later eighteenth century the artist was
hardly the unfashionable, rejected figure portrayed by subsequent writers,
particularly the Goncourts. Art market records indicate that his works sold
very well, and he developed innovative themes. Although he never became
a member of the Academy, he lived in the Louvre during most of his
career; after the Revolution he served as a curator for the new Louvre
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museum. In the course of her argument Schroder makes the important
point that despite official government urging for a renewal of the noble
genre of history painting there was an ongoing taste, and a market, for the
rococo. One might add that this trend can be paralleled in the enormous
poptdarity in the 1770s and '80s of decorative, lighthearted, and often
erotic statues, terracottas, and porcelains, by such artists as Clodion, Marin,
Bokot, and Houdon.
JoLynn Edwards's contribution, "John Law and His Painting
Collection: Connoisseur or Dupe?" is centered on the ownership of art, in
this instance during the earlier eighteenth century. It deals with an
international subject: the art collection of the Scottish-born financier who
became Comptroller-General of France and spent his last years in Venice.
Consulting inventories made shordy after Law's death and over a halfcentury later, Edwards describes the nature of the collection, which
characteristically for contemporary taste in France consisted largely of
Venetian paintings from the fifteenth to eighteenth centuries, primarily
history paintings and portraits. The authenticity of many of the works is
open to question, along with Law's abilities as a connoisseur, during this
period when the modern European art market was taking shape.
Catherine Whistler's artide, significantly tided "On the Margins in
Madrid: Some Questions of Identity at the Real Academia de Bellas Artes
de San Fernando, 1744—1792," is concerned with a period of Spanish art
falling between the Golden Age of the seventeenth century and the time
of Goya. Although its production is not as well known or regarded as the
output of either of those eras, it saw the foundation in 1752 of the royal
academy of arts. This instimtion, sponsored by a new Bourbon regime,
reflected French modds both in its organkation of the arts and its role in
the drive toward political centralization. It was, however, administered by
noblemen rather than artists, and foreign practitioners were more highly
honored than Spanish artists. Despite ongoing opposition by the latter
group, foreign-born artists contributed significantly to the quality of
teaching in the academy.
Anton Raphad Mengs plays a significant role in this regard; Whistler's
essay features an illustration of his thoughtful and sensitive Self-Portrait oi
c. 1773. His "reforming spirit and passionatdy hdd views on art" (82) and
his "polemical fire" (84) ultimately had a profound effect on the Spanish
academy. In contrast, Patrida Crown has little regard for Mengs. Her essay,
"Clothing the Modern Venus: Hogarth and Women's Dress" dismisses
him as a "pseudo-classical" artist (96). Mengs's orientation was in fact very
unlike Hogarth's; as Crown demonstrates Hogarth repeatedly displayed a
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decided appreciation for rococo adornment in his Analysis of Beauty. Her
essay presents the various and subtle ways that the English artist portrayed
women's dress in his prints in order to convey or enhance meaning, and
points out his connections with the commercial world of clothing.
"Sir Joshua Reynolds, Edmund Burke, and the Grand Whiggery," the
contribution of Martin Postle, and "Storming the Acropolis: Gender, Class,
and Classicism in Eighteenth-Century England," by Andrew Carrington
Shelton both provide welcome additions to the understanding of works by
major English artists. Posde details the history of the close friendship
between Reynolds and Burke, both men for various reasons being
antipathetic toward George III and championing the views of the landed
aristocracy, the Whigs. This nuanced and thoughtful essay demonstrates
Reynolds's interest in politics and increasing adoption of Whig positions,
visible even in the portraits he elected to exhibit in the 1770s and 1780s at
the Royal Academy. In what can be viewed in some ways as a pendant
essay, Shelton focuses on Joseph Wright of Derby's portrait of Sarah
Clayton, the energetic spinster daughter of a successful merchant family in
provincial Liverpool. Shelton's particularly careful and responsive reading
of this painting finds links to the sitter's feminist stance, an orientation that
is also apparent in her patronage of sculpture. He identifies the architec
tural drawing prominently featured in the portrait as an early copy of the
plan of the Propylaea as it appeared in Le Roy's French publication of
1758; its inclusion declares that this ambitious and independent woman
participated in what had previously been considered a purely masculine
realm of cosmpoHtan architectural knowledge.
The final article in the collection, William L. Pressly's "James Barry
and the Print Market: A Painter-Etcher avant la lettiref focuses on works by
the Irish artist whose erratic personality also receives considerable attention
in Postle's text. Barry was highly active in producing printed variations of
his own paintings and those by other artists but also created original prints
not copying any previously existing works of art. Especially in this last
category he experimented with printmaking techniques, as dramatically
displayed in two recently discovered works. Both of these small pieces
portray "brooding philosophers" (145) of the sort represented in his large
painting, Elysium and Tarii/w. Pressly also adds to the catalogue of the
artist's prints the copperplate (of which there is no surviving impression)
reproducing a painting by Poussin whose subject. The Blind Orion Searching
for the Rising Sun, would have appealed to Barry.
It is of course impossible in a compilation of this scope to touch On
all relevant matters, yet the absence of any but the slightest reference to
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accomplishments in architecture and sculpture is regrettable. Also missing
are any considerations of non-European arts or cultures as well as those of
central and eastern Europe and Scandinavia. On the other hand, the
importance of the discoveries and insights offered by the volume's essays
^ m^es it a valuable addition to the growing body of literature dealing with
visual studies during this watershed period.

Philip Smallwood. Reconstructing Criticism: Pope's
Essay on Criticism and the Logic of Definition. Lewisburg: Bucknell University Press, 2003. Pp. viii + 226.
$43.50.
Reviewed by John Morillo, North Carolina State
University
Philip Smallwood's book greets readers with several disconcerting
surprises. Despite its subtitle, ihe expected focus on Pope and interpreta
tion of the Err0i on Criticismis limited to the final few chapters. The rest of
the study is devoted to redefining criticism philosophically. Rather than
'Tope," the key word in the title is instead "reconstructing," a strategic
alternative to "deconstructing" and a nod to R. G. CoUingwood. Yet this
book is not simply against theory: it is anti-theoretical and pro-theoretical
simultaneously. It is as Continental and theoretical in its intellectual roots
as it is British in its sensibility about propriety and common sense. Kant,
Heidegger, and Gadamer share epigraphic places of honor with Johnson,
Arnold, and Leavis. Deontological ethics and Idealism consort with
Johnsonian sententiousness. It pays particular homage to Collingwood's
Kantian work on aesdietics and history by endorsing Collingwood's view
of history as a non-alien past considered vital to self-knowledge in the
present. To promote a neglected pre-structuralist critical past, the study
recalls and revitalizes the notion of criticism via periodic excerpts from
influential works by poet-critics and academic critics firom the eighteenth
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through mid-twentieth centuries. At its best, this book usefully surveys
definitions of literature and critidsm from many influential and witty critics
before the celebrated "linguistic turn" turned into, it argues, a radical left
turn. Smallwood raises some important issues for the fhture of academic
literary criticism, including its translatability to non-specialists, its often
nasty internal power struggles, and the need for discussing the place of
aesthetic and moral responses in our profession.
The book's argument, however, is often rhetorically self-defeating
when it appeals to traditions of liberal humanism and pluralism, because
it barely conceals its smoldering anger over the way for the last thirty years
or so theoretical criticism ("Theory") has been, it claims, fundamentally
mistaken in its concepts and objects: "Academic experts encourage us to
consider one forgotten work after another as worthy of consideration"
(35). Smallwood drives apostates from correct criticism from the critical
fold with the help of John Ellis's Literature host (Yale University Press,
1997) and warns against perils from false critical brethren in a sweeping
jeremiad against "Marxist criticism, feminist approaches, deconstruction,
postmodernism, postcolonialism, gay and lesbian theory, and so on" (16).
An insidious Theory, badly masking its own totalitarian tendencies, then,
has attacked criticism from within. Unfortunately, much as Collingwood's
1940s campaign against Continental totalitarianism, according to Charles
Booth, was "marked by retreat from the even-handedness implied by his
metaphysics" (www.philosophers.co.uk/cafe/ phil_feb2004. htm),
Smallwood's study similarly undercuts its more engaging pleas to restore
"the communal and social experience of reflecting on criticism" (156) by
resorting to hyperbolic rhetoric against an enemy characterized variously
as a "part-nihilistic, part-pluralistic dead end—sometimes known as
'postmodernism'" and "the wreckage of the poststructuralist landscape"
(65,160). One passage meant to critique most attempts to define criticism
empirically becomes unwittingly the best portrait of this book's own
claims: "they reflect what the person forming the definition thinks that
criticism ought to be Uke, or would be like if only order could be imposed
on the concept's confusion. They are more expressive of an unfulfilled
wish or hope on the part of the speaker than a description, the irrepressible
craving for clarity and conviction in a context whose laws do not seem to
allow it" (72).
Though the book's critical enemies' list from the 1980s is unsurpris
ing, it is distinctive in its gradual extension backward to include many prestructuralist critics who have also, Smallwood aver^committed fundamen
tal errors in defining their critical practice. Wellek and Frye come off worse
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than young Pope by exemplifying for Smallwood what Swift might have
called system-building. At the same time that the book is barricaded against
Theory, it also requires assent to very particular and arguable theoretical
and philosophical positions as it attempts to win never-ending philosophi
cal battles over idealism vs. empiricism, concepts vs. words, and beliefs
about the past's relationship to the present In method this book, despite
advocating the concreteness of specific textual examples and keeping
literary criticism trained logically on specific literary texts, works in its own
speculative, theoretical territory to try to trump the theorists at their own
game.
The author's candid admission, "I am not a philosopher" (25), jostles
uneasily with his text's loosely philosophical form. The book offers an
ambitious philosophical prolegomenon: "I have suggested why, in the task
of defining, an idealist Conception of criticism must be preferred to both
social-constructivist and empirical-cognitive definitional modes" (160). It
frequently deploys numbered claims minutely canvassed for their logical
inconsistencies rather than literary close-readings, even of Pope. Determin
ing the audience for this book is difficult, because its more advanced
theoretical claims are often followed by evidence presented like primers in
introductory philosophy and logic; "If Pope's Essay = x and criticism - y,
then if x corresponds to y in all its aspects, attributes, essentials, and so on,
the poem defines criticism" (148). These are potentially useful to under
graduates, yet are framed by enough specialist language and Idealist
assumptions that such readers may be bewildered, while others more
advanced may grow puxzled over Smallwood's taking "radical theory" to
task for its "exorbitant ideas and impenetrable expressions" (106) when he
opens the argument thus: "[The book is] united by the argument that the
move to dismantle criticism qua criticism is constructed on presupposings
whose effect is part of the function of criticism and known to the present
from the study of critical history—where and only where that study is wide
and open enough to the aesthetic value of critical texts" (25). This sounds
little like the plain-dealing Johnson and the witty and brief Pope Smallwood elsewhere so admires, and it suggests that in both its style and sense
of audience the book is left tugging at his own roots.
The argument is framed as a series of interlocking pieces in the puzzle
of what has gone wrong with criticism, and why. In Part One we hear that
"the definition of literature can provide, then, no conclusive account of the
concept literature' in essence, extension, or shape" (38). Does it really try
to do so very often? We are then introduced directly to CoUingwood,
whose works (especially The Idea ofHistoty [1956]) are enlisted to guide us
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toward a more essential understanding of the concept of criticism. This
redefined concept strategically draws protective boimdades between
criticism's purported proper concerns with art, beauty, and morals, and a
deluge of "extraliterary," illegitimate concerns (class, race, gender,
television, any history seeing the past as radically alien) within which "the
word [criticism] moves by stages unchecked toward a figurative extreme,
one that corresponds wiA the sense in which cultural studies regards all
phenomena as 'texts'" (59). Smallwood hopes criticism can emulate
Collingwood's transcendental idea of history, placing both history and
literature in the conceptual realm of the aesthetic.
After Part One of the book reveals inadequate empirical definitions
of criticism, the most original chapter shows that the vitriolic press wars
between British journalist-critics like Clive James and John Carey and
professional academic critics and theorists, with Terry Eagleton typically
standing in for that cadre, lead to no better or more comprehensive
definition of criticism. Further, these bitter rivals are shown to depend
equally on fundamental assumptions about reading that might defuse their
feuds were they acknowledged.
The subsequent section on value starts as an abstract philosophical
problem but ultimately points toward worldly concerns that tenured
radicals full of "extraliterary" agendas are imposing their specific political
values on texts and students. By the end of Part Two all of the chapter
topics are reviewed to show that anyone who tries to define criticism as
something totalizing and not as a transcendental concept will not succeed:
"Theory, judgment, evaluation, interpretation—all have their part to play
in defining criticism; but they do not finally define this central term,
because none of these concepts is adequate to replace 'criticism' in the
range and relations of its literary work" (120).
The last section of Smallwood's theoretical portico into Pope's critical
cathedral is, for this reader, the least satisfying. Its claim resembles
Edmund Burke's about the French Revolution; the Theorists are all so
dazzled by the idea of sheer novelty that the "gulf between the present of
criticism and its critical past" (22) is taken as a truly radical bre^ from all
lessons of the past. For Theorists history before 1986? 1968? 1945? is
bunk—or at best the record of prolonged ideological error. Many studies,
however, including Orrin Wang's fantastic Modernity (Johns Hopkins
University Press, 1996), have shown theory developing from dialectical
exchanges with historical literary periods from Renaissance to Romantic.
Smallwood makes no claims to be a Romanticist^ but his contribution to
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eighteenth-century studies in the chapters direcdy on Pope is no more
satisfying.
Despite his call for critics to always engage literary texts well, Smallwood's chapters on Essq)/ on Criticism offer claims too general to be
contentious or interesting: the Essc^% form as an "art object" stands in
tension with its status as an "historical event" (147); it is an amalgam of
voices, positions; it is ethical; it is concrete; visual metaphors abound in it;
it was subject to widespread imitation. To Smallwood's taste, the poem has
the proper philosophical stance, offering much commonplace wisdom
"reproduced in terms of a conception that is not itself an explicit proposi
tion about criticism" (152). It is also "not a work of reason, but of
apprehension, or, to adopt Kant's term, 'apperception'" (153). A Kantian
Pope, working in a style skeptical of pure reason, already knows what we
should know: "You cannot look around you and see criticism. You only
see different conceptions of criticism, codes of belief, principles, theories,
practices, approaches, a chaos of conflicting and overlapping opinions, and
so on. Consequently, the only way of expressing and comprehending this
concept precisely is via Art" (154-55). The Essc^ is thus "in tune with
Collingwood's thought" (155). It is non-propositional, personal, vital,
communal, and social. Any of these interpretations, however, finds too
btde situation within or even against post-1980 criticism of Pope (David
Mortis, Brean Hammond, Claudia Thomas) and eighteenth-century
culture, but diat is hardly a surprise after the tirade against most interpre
tive modes from the last twenty years.
The reading of Pope offers less illumination in two chapters on
criticism than in one earlier sharp but passing remark on the Dunciad:
"fascination with the victims is necessary to any satirist and something
without which the satire cannot rise to its heights" (85). Would that this
book, a sort of modern Dunciad with Theorists in place of index learners,
had staked more specific claims of this kind and had also shown more
sympathy or charity to its own caricatured victims. It envisions tolerant,
enlightened critics capable of taking liberalism and humanity seriously, yet
it vilifies more often than it negotiates. In its drive toward critical essence,
the book avoids even talking with those who were inspired by many critical
changes in the academy, ones admittedly not to all tastes but nonetheless
worthy of a fairer hearing. The book's final item in a four-point plan
blueprints a remarkably small room to house future critical conversations
about Pope or others: "Fourth, theory of literature may be the genetic
name for theories (in the plural) of the features and aspects of literature
(style, narrative, character, prose, poetry, and so forth), and also (nowadays)
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theories of many extraliterary things that have generated theories of their
own that are not theories of literature—^life, morals, power, sexuality,
politics, society" (157). For the good of future literary criticism we indeed
ought to reintegrate further the artistry of literature into professional
criticism of it, and we ought to avoid obfuscating prose whatever our
critical stripes or politics. To this reader, weary of theory wars from either
opposing army, Smallwood's study offers too little either to ameliorate the
sigmficant problems he spots with some of modern criticism's more
"intractable and impenetrable obscurities" (104) or to contribute more
particularly to a richer understanding of the work of Pope.

*

G. Gabrielle Starr, Lyric Generations: Poetry and the
Novel in the Long Eighteenth Century. Baltimore:Johns
Hopkins University Press, 2004. Pp. x + 298. $42.00.
Reviewed by Tiffany Potter, University of British
Columbia
Late in her discussion of the relationship between lyric and the novel,
Gabrielle Starr quotesJ. Paul Hunter's famed assertion that, as a genre, the
novel, like whales, will swallow anything. Starr's investigation of "generic
appropriations of the lyric" (8) attempts to prove that the lyric was not
entirely digestable and in fact emerged from mid-century immersion in the
novel changed and more powerful because of its temporary ingestion,
Generations i% an ambitious effort to link the long literary tradition of lyric
poetry to both the origins and the implications of the eighteenth-century
English novel. Parts of the position are effectively argued, but in all Starr's
claims seem overstated, dependant upon a broad and fluid definition of
lyric and an approach that firequendy treats Samuel Richardson as
singularly representative of the eighteenth-century novel as a genre.
The central premise of lyric Generations is that "a wide range of
eighteenth-century novels absorbed and adapted lyric conventions in
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presenting private experience. Patterns from the ode, elegy, epithalamium,
and courtly lyric were used to structure emotional events and individual
perceptions. In this process, a melding of conventions would take place.
The novel's chiastic realism, its insistence on domestic intimacy, the
domestic occasion, and sympathetic response, all influenced the future of
the lyric" (198). Using nearly exclusive reference to Richardson's fiction,
Starr builds the first half of the book on the argument that elements of
lyric that readers could be expected to recognize function as marks of
artifice, giving intimate access to the constructedness of representation and
signaling the reader's entrance into a fictional world that is designed to
affect us strongly. Identifiable elements of lyric are included, she argues, to
guide die reader's emotional investment and responses, the effect of what
she terms "chiastic sites"—^"those places in the texts where readers are
asked to map experiences of the world of dates, times, places, and letters
onto the world of the fictional—to cross the boundaries of imagination
and realities." Starr's thesis depends on this alternative to mimesis, which
in turn depends on the argument that lyric elements are central to
eighteenth-century readers' developing ability to "move from the real as a
space of reading to the fictional as a space of imagining" (13), since "P]yric
provides an order for emotional experience familiar to the culturally
literate; it creates an open frame for sharing the affective" (121).
Starr's second line of inquiry—that of the influence of the cultural
privileging of the novel on the eventual re-emergence of the lyric in
Romantic poetry—^is much more persuasive than the first, that the lyric is
identifiably and specifically rewritten in the novel. The most effective part
of the book is its last chapter, in particular the discussion of the influence
of the novel's elevation of Richardsonian domesticity on Worsdworth and
Cowper and on the lyric form of the narrative poem of the wanderer
(though I struggle with the conclusion that this relationship eventually
means that "the novelistic is brought under the rubric of the poetic; it is
rendered as a mode ultimately under poetic control" [187]).
There are strengths in the first section of this book as well, and they
come most often when Starr engages elements of the novel that are in
some way fairly explicitly poetic. Starr's discussions of interpolated lyric
poems in Clarissa and Pamela document effectively the ways in which the
lyric genres are used to enforce generically trained emotional response in
both readers and characters. Similarly effective are the extended discus
sions of the "mad fragments" of letters that Clarissa writes after her rape
(linked illuminatingly to the lyric elements of the Book of Job), and of the
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relationship between the emblem poetry of Herbert and the emblematic
messages communicated by Clarissa's decoration of ber own coffin.
Still, l^ricGenerations tzis&s some major methodological concerns. The
first is the fluid defmition of lyric that allows nearly everything to be linked
to the lyric (though not necessarily the lyrical) at different points in the
argument The introductory definition is itself alarmingly slippery for a
foundational premise: "a changing body of conventions linked to a
particular mode and a particular group of literary kinds (sonnets, odes,
elegies, etc.)" that can be identified in "patterns visible if we read prose as
an aesthetic object" (12—13). At different points in the book, these patterns
encompass descriptive language (both domestic and landscape) (150,187);
language used to represent emotion or intimacy (39); language simulating
private identity of "lyric consciousness" (159); and epistolary eloquence in
the use of metaphor, allusion or other literary (not exclusively poetic)
devices (52, 139). The traditional narrative content of different forms of
lyric (including amatory lyric, lament, epithalamium, and elegy [7—8]) is also
compared to the narrative content of specific novels. The bagginess of
Starr's generic definition allows the lyric to shadow every description,
emotion, landscape, coming of age, courtship, wedding, triumph, mishap,
or death described in the eighteenth-century novel. Thus Starr argues that,
in essence, before the mid-eighteenth century, emotion and even experi
ence are the same thing as lyric: "The techniques of narration and
description that novelists used to create permeable consciousness through
momentary, intense contacts expanded dramatically over the second half
of the eighteenth century, going beyond the patterns set by lyric" (155).
The other dangerous effect of this sweeping and malleable definition
of lyric is its invitation to what can at times slip into special pleading. One
of the ways in which Starr affirms similarity between Richardson's novels
and Herbert's lyrics, for example, is to refer to Herbert's work as "letters
to God" (31). Similarly, several (at times persuasive) discussions depend on
a similarity of phrasing or tone between a specific passage in a novel and
a single specific lyric poem or line. The possibility of individual influence
is of course worth noting, but the widening of such examples into
generalixations about genre seems tenuous. Similarly, in sections like the
assertion of the lyric's generic dominance in descriptions of weddings,
selective elements, phrases; or scenes are addressed but are not attached in
a convincing way to the novel as a whole (either text or genre), as when
Pamela's "minuteness"in describing her wedding clothes and feast is used
as evidence that Richardson draws each element of Pamela's description
from epithalamion. Of course, one of Pamela's most noted traits is her
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need to document everythii^ in obsessive detail, from her bundles and her
virtue to her wedding day. Starr herself acknowledges this tendency in her
study, noting that "it may seem that I have occasionally fallen into the
temptation or trap of similitude, that I have collapsed one thing into the
other and have traced likeness at the expense of difference," but responds
to this recognition only with two paragraphs on the book's last page
"affirming the distinctions that separate one genre from the
other... [comprising a few, largely symbolic words" about Austen and
Wordsworth (200).
Austen and Wordsworth are only two of forty poets and novelists
addressed here over 200 pages of text and 90 pages of notes. Unfortunately
this breadth of engagement leads to frequent and at times startling brevity
of consideration of major texts and authors. All scholars know the
difficulty of publishing single-author studies these days, but in terms of the
novel, at least, that's really what this book is: Richardson and the Lyric (a
worthy study that is made in fragments here by virtue of the attempt to
overgeneralixe the thesis). In all, Richardson's novels are addressed in
dialogue with a series of lyric poets over some seventy pages dispersed
through the book. In comparison, Behn gets eleven pages, Ha3rwood
seven. Fielding three, Defoe, Manley and Burney two each, and Smollett
is left with only a single paragraph. This concise engagement of the major
novelists leads to some problematically sweeping statements such as,
"Richardson uses lyric to think through the ideal and our constant falling
away from it, while Fielding employs lyric to spark laughter at our
inadequacies" (125—26). This distinction, of course, can be made about
nearly any element of Fielding and Richardson's world views, leaving the
lyric essentially unaddressed in Fielding and low on a very long list of fulcra
on which Fielding and Richardson teeter.
In its stated desire to mediate between formalists and histoticists
(199), Lyric Generations emerges as a study of genre unconcerned with the
last twenty years of genre theory, which is disappointing, given the exciting
expansions of Starr's argument that such a theoretical framework might
invite. The book leaves a reader wishing either for more emphasis on the
direct arguments about specific forms of lyric and Richardson's novels (as
in the stronger single articles Starr has published on this materia^ or for
the meta study of genre that the title suggests. As it stands, this book offers
intriguing snippets about dozens of eighteenth-century writers amid an
analysis that is weakened by its effort to stretch a persuasive argument on
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Richardson into a sweeping statement on the dialogicity of genre from
"The Canonization" to "The Prelude" and all points in between.

*

Jack Lynch. The Age of Elizabeth in the Age of Johnson.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003. Pp. xi +
224. $65.00.
Reviewed by David H. Radcliffe, Virginia Tech Uni
versity
It has long been customary to think of eighteenth-century Britain in terms
of Augustan Rome. Jack Lynch invites readers to think of it in terms of
Elizabethan England. From the renaissance, he argues, writers inherited
the practice of dividing history into "ancient, medieval, and modern,"
dating modernity from the revival of ancient learning. As time passed
however, "the modem age had grown unwieldy, and had to be split in two.
In that split, what we call the Renaissance was born. The humanists
invented their own modernity, but it took the next age to turn it into the
last age, a period with a beginning and an end" (7). Just as the recent past
was reconceived as a period, so a new self-understanding was required to
define the eighteenth-century as modernity (it would become a period only
after the Romantics distinguished themselves from it as their own "last
age"). Critics writing about an eighteenth-century Augustan age have not
paid sufficient attention to its debts to, and departures from, earlier
Elizabethan classicism, in part because the Renaissance as understood by
Johnson's contemporaries was a far different affair than that popularized
by Lamb, Hazlitt, and Burckhardt: for the eighteenth century, it was an era
of theology, Latinity, and scholarship, as opposed to maypoles, gusto, and
liberal thought.
This is plainly a plausible argument, though one beset with the
difficulties implicit in any schema of periodization: historicists need
structural uniformity to establish the common character of an age, but also
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internal disagreements to account for why one period replaces another. It
is notoriously difficult to unite synchronic and diachronic ways of thinking
in a single argument. The first challenge Lynch tackles is the absence of the
• - word "renaissance" from the eighteenth-century vocabulary. When writers
spoke of "the last age," or the "age of Elizabeth," or of the "revival of
learning," were they referring to what would later come to be regarded as
the Renaissance? Well, yes in a general sort of way, though the idea was
(and remains) somewhat inchoate. Given differences of usage ("The
eighteenth century used a medley of categories both intrinsic and extrinsic
to literature in looking back at English literary history" [8]), how is the
historian to establish the norms necessary to define the eighteenth-centiiry
as a period and to differentiate it from what precedes and follows it?
It is at this point that Lynch makes the bold move that gives the book
its tide: The Age of Elizabeth in the Age of Johnson. We are to look to Samuel
Johnson for the necessary norms (the book is in fact as much about
Johnson as it is about the age of Elizabeth). Lynch concedes up front that
Johnson's critical opinions were neither coterminous with those of his age,
or consistent among themselves. This is a dangerous concession. But we
are to recall that all period schema are heuristic and imperfect: "provisional
aides to comprehension, not objective truths, and should always be
regarded with circumspection" (2). Judged by this standard, the selection
of Johnson works well; one does come away with a provisional compre
hension that sheds new light on the critic and his age. Moreover, Johnson
was both a comprehensive intellect and a great respecter of conventional
wisdom.
Readers of the literature on Samuel Johnson know well that from
early to late he was absorbed with neo-Latin literature and Renaissance
humanism. Not much was made of this until J. C. D. Clarke's recent and
controversial book on Johnson and Jacobitism, Samuel Johnson: Literature,
Religion and English Cultural Politics from the Restoration to Romanticism
(Cambridge University Press, 1995); Lynch takes a different tack, placing
. Johnson's interest in the revival of learning in the context of what his
contemporaries had to say about the Elizabethans: "Johnson is discussed
together with Hume, Hurd, and other seemingly inimical writers. In spite
of their differences they have much in common, and it is inadvisable to
turn Johnson into an arch-Augustan and Warton into the first of the
Romantics, with a declaration of never-the-twain-shall-meet. The strands
traditionally called neoclassical and pre-Romantic cannot always be so
easily untangled" (15). This is a fine insight, home out in the series of
chapters to follow. The Elizabethan revival conventionally identified with
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pre-romanticdsm was indeed propelled by classical philologists, not only
Hurd and Warton, but Theobald, Upton,Warburton, Jortin, and the whole
constellation of lesser lights annotating Spenser, Shakespeare, and Milton.
Johnson differed from them in addressing himself to general readers, but
by inclination and training he was very much a part of this group.
Rather than pursue Johnson's philology in depth. Lynch gives it a
broad base in a series of chapters on historiography, the Tudor myth in
contemporary politics, Anglican theology, and linguistics. These essays are
surprisingly entertaining (Lynch emulates Johnson in making complex
matters lively and accessible) while demonstrating again and again not only
that Johnson's interests were shared by his contemporaries, but that
eighteenth century thinkingabout important matters was grounded in their
attitudes towards the age of Elizabeth. Quotations are selected with skill,
and the argument delivered with clarity and style: "Anglo-Saxon and
Restoration English could, if necessary, be conscripted to serve as pure
sources of literary English diction, but neither was an adequate surrogate
for Augustan Latin. Another option, though, proved more suitable: the
undefiled wells of 'the writers before the restoration.' The age of
Elizabeth, it turns out, provides not only the source of the metaphor, but
also the best model of linguistic purity" (109). Here we observe the
humanist's concern with purity of diction (the old modernity) intersecting
with an attempt to establish renaissance writers as vernacular "ancients"
(the new modernity).
This survey concludes with a chapter on the reception of Milton.
While the argument is cogent, I am not persuaded that Johnson's age
regarded Milton as an Elizabethan or that it regarded its own modernity as
belated. Lynch finds quotations to this effect, though I believe the
preponderance of evidence lies the other way. Most of Johnson's
contemporaries identified modernity with refinement, and consequentiy
began the modern era in literature not with Dryden but with Waller,
Cowley, and Denham (the schema adopted in Johnson's Lives of the Poets).
Lynch is surely right in identifying Milton as a liminal figure, though (I
believe) almost as surely wrong in placing him on the far side of the line.
In 1730 the author of Paradise Lost was being hailed as the founder of
modern poetics (the blank verseJohnson cared so litde for) and in 1780 as
the founder of a "new" modern poetics (the odes and elegies and sonnets
Johnson liked even less). This modal change was signaled by the abrupt
revaluation of Milton's juvenilia, raising an issue Lynch might well have
addressed: were his early poems regarded as "Elizabethan" (and hence of
the last age) or as "neo-Elizabethan" (and hence of the present age)? I
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would argue that Collins, Gray, and the Wartons understood the difference
and imitated Milton not as the last of the vernacular ancients but as the
first of the vernacular moderns.
The Age of Elia^abeth in the Age of Johnson will give great pleasure to
anyone who finds such moot questions intellectually stimulating; Johnson
certainly did. He objected strongly to the affectations of the obsolete by
Milton and his imitators because (like most people in the age of Johnson)
he believed in progress. This belief in progress was not shared by Spenser's
generation, and hence becomes a good candidate for discriminating
modernities. But Johnson was not consistent. Not only would he defend
or attack refinement depending on the task in hand, he would also position
himself as historian, historicist, or universaHst. Such pragmatic flexibility
differentiates Johnson's modernity from that which followed. It is implicit
dogma in historicist criticism that because everything is connected through
culture, periods are or ought to be all of a piece. Johnson and his contem
poraries, untrammeled by such views, were content to date the modern age
in theology from the Reformation, in politics from the Glorious Revolu
tion, and in manners from the reign of Queen Anne.
For cultural historians, such distinctions tend to register not as
differences but as "contradictions." For his part. Lynch frequently points
out inconsistencies in eighteenth-century characterizations of the age of
Elizabeth, which was variously characterized as ignorant and learned,
refined and barbaric. While Lynch may be right to attribute such contrary
assessments to outmoded metaphors, modern readers of The Faerie Queen
and Titus AndronicushzYt been known to arrive at similar conclusions. Jack
Lynch shares Johnson's skepticism about generalizations, including his
own: he presents a new and different schema for looking at the«ighteenth
century, one that can tested against the facts for accuracy and against itself
for coherence; flaws will be found, and improved schema can be formed
in response. Issues of periodization aside, this book succeeds brilliantly in
its primary aim of illustrating the centrality of Elizabethan writing to
Augustan understandings of history and literature. It complicates and
enriches our understandii^ of the age of Johnson by demonstrating how
the phenomena conventionally referred to as classicism and romanticism
were alike informed and influenced by eighteenth-century interpretations
of Renaissance authors.
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Ellen Pollak, Incest and the English Novel, 1684-1814.
Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2003. Pp. x
+ 261. $39.95.
Reviewed by Jones DeRitter, University of Scranton
At the beginning of her new book on the early English novel, Ellen Pollak
announces that her goal is to "examine the extent to which...textual
representations of actual, averted, or imagined incest might fruitfully be
said to contribute to the production and consolidation of the power /
knowledge discourse that grounds modern theories about incest" (4).
Pollak is an erudite critic and a good writer, and her book provides us with
provocative readings of the incest episodes in novels by Behn, Manley,
Defoe, and Austen. She does not finally succeed in demonstrating that
there was a coherent early modern discourse about incest that contributed
to the development of the early English novel and to twentieth-century
intellectual history, but the impressive body of research behind this
argument and the quality of her prose make this an entertaining and
informative read.
Pollak's first chapter balances the twentieth-century analyses of the
incest taboo by Freud, Levi-Strauss, and Rubin against the seventeenthcentury political economies of Locke and Filmer, and her second provides
a Foucauldian foundation for her critical discussions by exploring the
social, cultural, and legal traces of an early modern discourse on this topic.
This is followed by chapters onBehn's Ijave-Letters,Manley's
Atalantis,
and Defoe's Moll Flatters. Pollak's sixth chapter introduces us to "mater
nity, textuality, and the problem of origins" by glancing briefly at the incest
episodes in Henry Fielding's Tom Jones, Sarah Fielding's David Simple, and
Burney's Evelina, by dwelling a bit too loi^ oh a rather silly joke in Sterne's
Tristram Shandy, and by providing a summary and exegesis of Eleanora, an
anonymous novella about mother-son incest set in seventeenth-century
Scotland. Her closing chapter explores the relationship between "liberty,"
the transatlantic slave trade, and the endogamous marriage that provides
the happy ending, such as it is, for Austen's Mansfield Park.
The claim that "a striking number of English prose fiction narratives
written between 1684 and 1814 predicate dieir plots on the tabooed
possibility of incest" (3) did not originate with Pollak, but she embraces it
as a necessary precondition for her argument and does not spend much

576

1650-1850

time defending it. Nevertheless, the proposition is debatable on at least two
points. First, we might ask what exactly is meant by a "striking" number.
The dates in Pollak's title refer to the first part of Low-Ls/few and to
Mansfield Park. Of the thousands of prose narratives published in English
over this 130-year period, the group that includes explicit fictional
treatments of "actual, averted, or imagined incest" probably numbers less
than fifty, and Pollak lists fewer than twenty titles in her study. (To double
that number, she would have to include American novels and English
Gothic novels.) This means that fiction about incest was roughly as
popular in theeighteenth-century cultural marketplace as the group of texts
that presented various re-workings of the proto-abolitionist "Inkle and
Yarico" story. Second, we m%ht ask what it means for a plot to be
"predicated upon the...possibility of incest." Predication implies real
contii^ency, and while Pollak makes a good case for the centrality of the
incest episode in Moll Flanders, and, perhaps more surprisingly, for the
persistence of at least metaphorical incest throughout the latter part of
Love-Letters, she is less successful when she argues that four relatively brief
episodes in The New Atalantis provide the key to understanding that long
and rather loosely organized work, and when she argues that Sophia
Western is a maternal figure so that she can assert that mother-son incest
is "foundational" in Tons Jones. (A minor technical point: it is somewhat
inconvenient for PoUak to be using a facsimile reproduction of The New
Atalantis for her citations, rather than Ros Ballaster's fine New York
University Press edition.)
In addition, because her argument focuses on a relatively small
number of works, Pollak seems constrained to argue that they have more
in common than they actually do. In order to promote the claim that these
texts present something like a unified discourse, Pollak implies that insofar
as the main thread of her argument is concerned, there is no significant
difference either between consanguineous and affinal incest, or between
incest that is actual and intended and incest that is imaginary or unwitting.
With respect to the first pair of categories, there is historical evidence,
which Pollak cites (34), to suggest that some British men and women of
this period who regarded consanguineous incest as fundamentally wrong
were nevertheless willing to tolerate affinal incest when the circumstances
surrounding specific marriages made the legal or ecclesiastical definition of
kinship seem irrelevant or excessively technical. Should modern readers be
less discriminating? Neither Philander's adulterous affairwith his "sister"(in-law) in Behn's Love-Letters nor the marriage between first cousins that
ends Austen's Man field Park matches up particularly well with any modern
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definition of incest (oi, for that matter, with each other). Is the mere fact
that each of these relationships was labeled incestuous by some contempo
rary authority enough to justify PoUak's decision to treat them as interlock
ing pieces of a single puzzle?
The difference between actual, intentional incest and imaginary or
unwitting incest also seems more significant than Pollak is willing to
acknowledge Both Freud and Levi-Strauss suggest that the incest taboo
plays a crucial role in the development of coherent and cohesive human
social units; Rubin's primary contribution to the discussion is her
recognition that when families and communities are organized into
patriarchal structures, the incest taboo inevitably helps to rationalize and
perpetuate the commodification of women. Unfortunately, much of
PoUak's study seems to depend on the unwarranted assumption that the
only important purpose of the incest taboo is to serve the interests of the
patriarchy in this way. By focusing so intently on this claim, she seems at
times to be unaware that the incest taboo also provides children with some
protection against physical and emotional abuse by the adults in their lives,
and that its enforcement leads over time to an expanding network of social
and kinship relationships. If we begin from this perspective, violations of
the incest taboo can be made to reflect not only upon chaUenges to
patriarchal privilege, but also upon the failure of adults to protect their
children and the failure of a kinship network to define and provide a safe
passage into adult autonomy. PoUak is at her best when she is analyzing
works by Behn, Defoe, and Austen, who deploy the incest taboo as a
means of exposing, enforcing, and reestablishing patriarchal control of the
traffic in women. She is less successful with writers like Fielding and
Burney, who use the trope of unwitting incest for other purposes.
FoUowing in the footsteps of Christine von Boheemen, PoUak argues
that the incest episode in TomJones lays the blame for the hero's suffering
at the door of his mother, who has proved herself to be misguided and
ungovernable by having a child out of wedlock. She extends this argument
to Evelinahy asserting that the heroine's longed-for reunion with her father
is forestalled and nearly prevented by the machinations of Madame DuVal
and Dame Green, two other ungovernable women who scheme against
conventional social distinctions to advance their own agendas. The
fundamental problem here is that iii each case, the happy resolution of the
plot does not allow the resident patriarch to regain control of the situation.
Rather, in each case the ending weakens the incumbent regime by ceding
the right of self-determination to the insurgents. Tom Jones is saved by the
timely intervention of Jenny Jones, who is restored to Allworthy's favor as
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a reward for her trouble, and Allworthy himself insists that Sophia's
forgiveness and acceptance can be bestowed by her alone. Burney's novel
ends with a double wedding involving two children of Sir John Belmont
and a third person, Polly Green,who is stillwidely assumed to be bis child,
but Sir John himself remains in isolation, presumably contemplating his
mistreatment of both bis illegitimate son and bis legitimate daughter.
Obviously, both Tom and Evelina are happy to have gained respectability
at last (by whatever irregular means), and it would be foolish to assert that
Fieldii^ or Bumey sov^bt to undermine the patriarchal structures that
finally legitimate their protagonists. Still, the endings of Tom Jones and
Evelina do call into question Pollak's apparent belief that every literary
treatment of actual, averted, or imagined incest during this period points
invariably toward a perceived need for greater patriarchal control.
Although Pollak's overarching thesis should be regarded with
skepticism, her argument has many incidental virtues, and rea!ders who
disagree with her main point may nevertheless find her book worth owning
and worth reading carefully.

Kathryn Temple, Scandal Nation: Law and Authorship
inBritainy 1750-1832. Ithaca: Cornell University Press,
2003. Pp. X + 242. $45.00.
Reviewed by John O'Erien, University of Virginia
After the English historian Catherine Macaulay, widowed and aged fortysix, married William Graham, a twenty-one-year-old Scot in 1778, her
elderly patron, Thomas Wilson, circulated a letter from Macaulay to
himself that Macaulay almost certainly expected would have remained
private. What did the letter contain? We cnnot know for certain, because
it was never published—though Wilson made threats and at least at one
point lined up a publisher—^and has been lost to history, leaving us only
the accounts of the letter's contents that were promulgated in the many
satirical attacks on Macaulay in print and theatrical performance. What

Book Reviews

579

evidence we have suggests that Macaulay was trying to be conciliatory,
letting Wilson know why she had decided to marry a much younger man
rather than, as many expected, the patron who had long supported her
career. But what the letter may have said is, as Kathryn Temple demon
strates in her excellent new book Scandal Nation: Law and Authorship in
Britain, 1750—1832, much less important than what its entry into public
discourse meant. Mocked in print, theater, and gossip, Macaulay found
herself at the center of a scandal from which her reputation never
recovered. Having been one of the most successful historians in England
in the 1770s after the publication of her History of England and her more
conversational History in Letters, Macaulay was never able to practice her
trade as an author of English history again, her reputation in Britain
destroyed by public censure of her private life.
Temple takes the scandal over Macaulay's letter as an exemplary case
in the.eighteenth-century's ongoing cultural revolution that would in its
course redefine authorship, national identity, gender, and the law itself.
Scandal Nation includes four such case histories, each of which. Temple
argues convincingly, constitutes a site wherein the stakes of these
categories becomes acutely intelligible, or, to use the term that Temple,
pointing to the basis of each of these scandals in printed texts, prefers,
"legible." In addition to her analysis of the Macaulay scandal. Temple
discusses Samuel Richardson's feud with the Irish publishers who pirated
Sir Charles Grandison in the1750s; the conflict between SamuelJohnson and
James Macpherson over the works that the latter claimed were authored by
a Scottish bard named "Ossian"; and the reaction to the 1831 publication
of a memoir by Mary Prince, a former slave whose writings' insertion into
abolitionist debates led to her testifying in a libel suit. As in the case of
Macaulay, Temple articulates not only what happened in each of these
scandals, but, far more importantly, why these events were framed as
scandals in the first place, what cultural norms they followed, pressured,
and ultimately violated, taking them out of the domain of the taken-forgranted and making them legible as examples that can teach us about the
unspoken limits of the literary, the national, the personal, and the legal. The
result in Temple's hands is frequendy a tour de force of historicist inquiry,
an analysis that demonstrates not only the constructedness of categories
like literature. Great Britain, and the law, but their interrelationship, the
way in which they speak to and, in moments of cultural crisis, help
articulate each other.
Thus the scandal over Macaulay's letter is much less important for
what it may or may not have said than for the very fact that its dissemina-
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tion, mightily refracted through the filter of satire, made it impossible for
Macaulay to continue as an author of English histories. What were the
conditions that made a private matter into a career-ending public event?
As. Temple shows, the making-public of a private letter was particularly
damaging to the author of histories that designed to tell the story of the
English nation, as it seemed to be drawn from the genre against which
what Temple calls "national history" defined itself—the secret history, the
gossipy, thinly-disguised accounts of the private lives of the rich and
famous that had been a popular genre in the early part of the.eighteenth
century. The public airing of the letter enabled Macaulay's critics to present
national histories with the genre that they had seemed to repress, under
mining her claims to be able to write with the authoritative abstraction
deemed necessary for representing the story of the nation. Still, when
Macaulay composed her letter to Wilson, she had reason to presume that
it would stay private, as a series of court cases in the course of the century
had established that the author of a letter, rather than its recipient,
controlled its publication. Macaulay had herself defended the rights of
authors in her 1774 tract entitled "Modest Plea for the Property of Copy
Right." Crucially, too, each of these factors was overdetermined by
Macaulay's gender: her claim to write national history and her control over
her own writings were compromised by, as they expose, the period's
double-standard that undercut women's ability to assert themselves in the
public sphere. For Temple, Macaulay's fall needs to be read as a narrative
of containment, one that exposes the fault-lines of the law, publicity,
gender, and authorship in eighteenth-century Britain: "The juridical failure
to protect Macaulay from public scandal established the order her status
as a public intellectual had violated" (169). Each of Temple's chapters
defdy uses the scandal it describes as an occasion in which the boundaries
of national identity, gender, the literary and the legal were challenged and
then redefined.
The parallels between the event that led to Macaulay's scandal (the
making-public of her letters) and her chosen genre of history-writing (for
which letters marked the private sphere against which national history
identified itself) are mirrored throughout Scandal Nation. Relying here on
a model of interpretation most persuasively described in recent years by
Fredric Jameson, Temple frequently reads the texts at hand—^Richardson's
Grandison, or Johnson's Journ^ to the Western Islands of Scotland, for
example—as offering allegories for the same nation-constructing exercises
that the scandals they set off articulate in a different register. Such a
reading strategy, in which the internal logic of a text mirrors the external
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logic of its cultural moment, pays perhaps its greatest dividends in
Temple's analysis of Sir Charles Grandison, where the narrative's vexed
relationship to Italy is legible as a displacement of conflict within the
British Isles, notably the conflict for cultural authority between P.ngland
and Ireland that flared up in that decade (and of which the piracy of
Grandison itself was a notable event.) Temple reads Richardson's emphasi.c
on the theme of cross-cultural tolerance in Grandison as an attempt to
defuse the threat of Irish nationalism; by making his hero Grandison an
English figure advocating tolerance toward Catholic Italy, Richardson was
promoting English toleration as the keynote of Britishness, blunting Irish
claims to cultural parity. Similarly, Temple reads the character of Clemen
tina, the Italian object of Grandison's romantic interest who, in the opinion
of many readers, takes over the novel, as a figure for what Richardson
takes to be the disruptive force of women in general and women writers
in particular. Here, Temple understands Richardson to be containing that
disruptive power both within the novel, by making a man the protagonist
for the first time in his career, and without it, by drawing in the expertise
of a wide circle of women correspondents. Proposing Grandison as a
model of English masculinity and cross-cultural tolerance, Richardson's
novel works out problems that were far more vexed in the world outside
its pages: Richardson was anything but tolerant of the Irish printers who
published their own, unauthorized edition of Grandison, and some of his
female correspondents were miffed at his claims for his own originality.
In her last chapter. Temple goes against the grain of the containment
model that organizes her first three cases, finding in the example of Mary
Prince an author whose scandalous entry into the public sphere destabil
ized, rather than reaffirmed, the idea of an English identity that could
readily be recognized and assumed. As the work of a working-class subject,
indeed a former slave who had been born in Bermuda, Prince's book The
Histoiy of Maty Prince: A West Indian Slave Pelated hy Herself (1831), exposed
the contradiction at the heart of British claims to a national identity
founded on liberty and freedom. Prince herself seems to have recognized
the power of allegoricalinterpretation, as her Histoiy uses the mundane task
of washing to critique British colonialism and class relationships. Describ
ing her humiliation at having to scrub the dirt off her master's back and her
resistance to washing the clothes of the Wood family after they brought
her with them to England, Prince shrewdly mobilized a working-class
discourse about the drudgery of washing to blur the line between the
categories of slave and servant and thereby to enlist working-class English
readers in the projects of abolition and reform. In her narrative, washing
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becomes a figure for servitude itself, a symbol of the brut^ty at the heart
of the colonial system abroad and the domestic space at home alike. Her
exposure of the lack of liberty and freedom in the institution that secured
Britain's international power led to a complicated series of interlocking
libel suits, cases where the law attempted. Temple argues, to contain the
threat exposed by the writings of Prince and other former enslaved persons
in this period, reffaming their testimony as a scandalous breach of the law.
But in the case of Mary Prince Temple sees a more complex dynamic at
work; although the law ultimately reinforced the sanctity of the Woods'
home against the evidence that Prince presented, the very fact that such a
voice could now be heard and read in public, entered into debate,
represents a significant change in the culture. Prince's case here marks the
emergence of a print-based mass public sphere, a medium within which
new voices could be heard.
Temple's four cases demonstrate the complexity and contingency of
categories that we still tend to take for granted; aU are situated at the
intersection of authorship, print publication, national identity-formation,
gender and the law, bringing the contours of each into the light of day.
What is sometimes less perspicuous in Temple's account is where these
categories were going, how they changed over the course of the century;
the case method she follows allows her to dig deep into specific moments,
but not necessarily to link them together. In a brief epilogue. Temple
suggestively points to the Irish pirates of Grandison, Macpherson, Macaulay,
and Prince as harbingers of globalization, pointers to the way that cultural
productions would increasingly be appropriated by subjects outside of the
national space in which they originated. Although she was an object of
scandal in Britain, Macaulay, for example, would become a model for
writers of national histories in the young United States, such as Mercy Otis
Warren. It would have been useful to readers if Temple offered more of
this kind of narration throughout the text, giving a greater sense of the
connections between these cases as well as their effects on the culture. But
the depth of Temple's inquiry and the clarity of her arguments make
Scandal Nation an exemplary case study in historically-informed criticism.
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Gloria Sybil Gross, In a Fast Coach with a Pretty Wo
man:Jane Austen and Samuel Johnson, New York: AMS
Press, 2002. Pp.« + 208. $62.50.
Reviewed by Lance Wilcox, Elmhurst College
The surprising thing about Gloria Sybil Gross's study of the influence of
Samuel Johnson on the writii^s of Jane Austen is that it hasn't been done
before, and more than once. Austen's fascination with Johnson's writings
is well known, but as a quick scan of Gross's bibliography reveals, this
fertile ground has gone largely unploughed. Aside from a few essays.
Gross's is the first work to dedicate to this issue the attention it deserves.
The attempt to articulate Johnson's impact on Austen is not without
its hazards. Both Johnson and Austen are satiric moralists, and it would be
easy simply to point out the parallels in their moral codes. This might earn
somebody an MA—it probably has—^but it would leave scholars unsatis
fied. Recognizing the limitations of such an approach. Gross shrewdly
focuses her attention, not on the virtues the two writers promulgate, but
on their rambunctious dissections of moral and prudential failure. Drawing
onJohnson's radical psychological analyses, Austen creates fictional worlds
that providedynamic explorations of personal and cultural discontent. Her
astringent social comedies retrace his own navigation, as he famously puts
it in Bxtsselas, of "the dangerous prevalence of imagination." Her plots and
characterizations chart friistration growing out of deep-seated, unsatisfied
longing. Gross also notes Johnson's interest in the plight of women,
especially tough-minded, independent women like Nekayah and Pekuah,
and his anguished obsession with the pathologies of family life. Gross
invites us to imagine the relish with which Austen must have enjoyed
Johnson's ferocious exploration of these topics before (or while) creating
her fictional worlds.
Both Johnson and Austen, Gross argues, dedicate their greatest
literary energies to the portrayal of the persons who spread these domestic
pathologies. Johnson's essays and Austen's novels provide casebooks of
the ways in which men and women, parents and children, lovers and other
strangers undermine each other's happiness and fix themselves in patterns
of emotional destruction. On the one hand, Johnson and Austen are
satirists: they parody and mock the narcissistic, thoughtless, and boorish.
On the other, they are psychologists and artists of a high order, and they
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throw themselves into their impersonations of these loopy egomaniacs
with tremendous zest. Both bring to their characterizations a fierce, furtive
delight in the destructive energies of their monster-fools.Johnson loves his
whining, letter-writing airheads (of both genders); Austen relishes the
vibrant mindlessness of a Lydia Bennet and the exultant vanity of a Sir
Walter Elliot. Johnson and Austen preach against vanity, folly, and malice,
but they also give them their due—^both as drivers of conduct and objects
of aesthetic fascination—and it is in this antagonistic empathy toward vice
that Gross sees their most interesting similarities.
Gross organizes her book in a sensible, if overly stiff, pattern. She
begins with an Introduction outlining most of the ideas above, moves to
a chapter on each of Austen's novels, and dutifully arrives at a Conclusion.
As the structure suggests, her book is more a contribution to scholarship
on Austen than Johnson. Each chapter picks up one thread of Johnson's
thought, illustrated in a few brief selections from his works, and then traces
its influence through one of Austen's novels. The structure has the
advantage of clarity, but it limits how deeply Gross can pursue her
investigations. Austen's writing develops dramatically from the broad farce
of Northanger Abb^ to the suave irony of Emma to the bittersweet
tragicomedy of Persuasion. Her mood darkens as her penetration deepens,
and it would be useful to follow the Johnsonian themes through this
complete developmental arc rather than lying each to one particular
volume.
The novel-by-novel structure occasionally also leads Gross to seek
literary influences at too superficial (and implausible) a level. For Austen's
most famous single sentence, the sparkling icicle that opens Pride and
Prejudice, Gross presents a convincing ancestor in Johnson's P,ambkr\\b:
"I was known to possess a fortune, and to want a wife; and therefore was
frequently attended by these hymeneal solicitors, with whose importunity
I was sometimes diverted, and sometimes perplexed." Like Thoreau with
his neighbor's ax, Austen borrows the sentence and returns it sharper than
when she took it. But in no other case are the textual borrowings suggested
by Gross this convincing. Austen does not in fact appear often to have
lifted particular passages, incidents, or characters from Johnson as either
a writer or a biographical figure. Despite Gross's claims, the verbal parallels
between Johnson and Austen are too loose and general to convince us, for
instance, that a family dinner scene in Sense and Sensibility was suggested by
a paragraph in Pambler 6 or that CoUins's spineless adulation of Lady
Catherine is based on Boswell's adulation of Johnson (pretty thought
though this is). Gross's evidence leads, rather, to the conclusion that what
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Austen learned frbm Johnson was what to observe and how to interpret
it. Her study makes it easy to imagine Austen reading Rasse/as and the
Rambler, turning her eyes upon her own contemporary society, and seeing
for herself the foEes, vices, and maladiesJohnson diagnoses. Her affinities
with Johnson exist at the level of social, moral, and psychological vision
rather than of verbal expression.
Of the six body chapters, those on Rride and Prejudice and Emma are
much the most illuminating and merit further discussion. The other four,
however, can be handled en masse^ as they are all compromised by the same
problem. Gross's accounts of NorthangerAbb^, Sense and Sensibility, Mansfield
Park, and Persuasion reflect a seemingly willfhl misconstruction of Austen's
artistic goals. Having established Austen as a Johnsonian moral satirist.
Gross recasts her as a romantic Freudian with affinities to D. H. Lawrence.
Gross describes the novels as reflecting a struggle between free,vital, erotic
impulses and the staid, dreary prudence of bourgeois morality. Austen
ultimately endorses the latter, though Gross implies that her heart is never
really in it. In each novel. Gross claims, a dynamic young woman meets a
man of intense erotic charge but settles instead for one whose major
attribute is a safe respectabEty. Gross sighs over Marianne's loss of
WEoughby, castigates Fanny as "a moral drudge" for refusing"the sexiest
man at Mansfield," and condemns Anne EEot for choosing Captain
Wentworth over Mr. EEot with Es "melting gaze at the Cobb."
To read Austen thus is not only to miss the profound point of her
fiction, it is (even worse) to miss the joke. WEoughby, Crawford,
EEot—these are malicious figures of fun, eternal adolescents, refined and
urbane Peter Pans. Austen's heroines prove themselves ready for mature
erotic relationsEps when they come to discern the difference between
these shallow, cooing boys and ethically mature men. The difference is not
one of respectabEty or even prudence, it is one of depth, of an actual, as
opposed to a merely apparent, capacity for love. Austen's heroines learn to
distinguish superficial charm from emotional depth just in time to be saved
from marriages promising trEy iGwW<?resque levels of dysfunction. Lacking
(or repudiating this interpretive key. Gross complains, for example, that
Austen arbitrarily darkens the characters of the Crawfords at the end of
Mansfield Park Austen, of course, does no such thing; the Crawfords,
though not as vicious as Wickham or Mr. EEot, are consistently presented
as morally, thin, spiritually inadequate, as having no there there. To miss
such precise moral characterization is to make Austen over into a very
Efferent, and lesser, novelist.
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With Pride and Prejudice and Emma, Gross wisely (if inexplicably)
reverses herself, preferring Darcy to Wickham, lionizing Mr. Knightley,
and, if anything, condemning Frank Churchill too harshly. Gross wonders
whether Austen based Elizabeth Bennet on Hester Thrale, seeing both as
the sort of combative, brainy women Johnson loved, and analyzes the
"fire-and-ice" relationship of those "good haters" Elizabeth and Darcy.
Gross's chapter on Emma represents her most successful excavation of
Johnsonian thought. Gross argues that Emma Woodhouse is an Idler in
precisely Johnson's sense; furthermore, that, except for Mr. Knightley,
practically all the characters in Emma are Idlers. Gross quotes Johnson's
description of the simple Idler as evincing "uneasiness without molesta
tion, and complaint without a grievance" and points to Mr. Woodhouse as
an example. She then cites Johnson's description of that form of idleness
"which dignifies itself by the appearance of business, and by making the
loiterer imagine that he has something to do which must not be neglected,
keeps him in perpetual agitation, and hurries him rapidly from place to
place"—and zeroes in on Emma herself, Mrs. Elton, Miss Bates, and
Frank Churchill. The shoe fits wonderfully. By contrast. Gross finds in Mr.
Kmghdey "Austen's fondest tribute.. .the speaking voice of Johnson,"
adding that "for a young woman alone in bedeviled straits.. .his tutelage
rings eminently Johnsonian." In her chapter on Emma Gross stays truest
to both Johnson and Austen, with splenid results: Emma, by becoming a
sort of commentary on The Idler, becomes more completely itself. Gross's
approach works so well, in fact, one can only wish she had been as true to
Johnson and Austen's shared moral vision in her other chapters as well.

%
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Deborah Kennedy, Helen Maria Williams and the Age
of Revolution. Lewisburg: Bucknell University Press,
2002. Pp. 276. $45.00.
Reviewed by Steven Blakemore, Florida Atlantic
University
-Helen Maria Williams (1761-1827) is known principally for her defense of
the French Revolution and her criticism of the Terror in a series of
epistolary responses that eventually became the eight-volume Letters from
France (1790-96). Though the prominence of Thomas Paine and Mary
Wollstonecraft and other radical luminaries have resulted in her
marginalLzation by critics and scholars, she was, in the revolutionary tumult
of the 1790s, a significant figure in the Anglo-American debate over the
French Revolution. Since 1930, Lionel Woodward's serviceable but dated
biography (in French) has been the only full-length treatment of Williams
and her life. In He/en Maria Williams and the Age of V.evolution, Deborah
Kennedy has addressed what has been a gaping lacuna in our knowledge
of Williams and has begun a restoration of her centrality to the ongoing
debate on France and its Revolution.
Kennedy's first chapter crystallizes Williams's social and political
formation. Born in London in 1761, Williams passed her first twenty years
in Scotland before moving with her family (her mother, sister, and half
sister) to London where she quickly became lionized as a promising young
poet known for her feminine sensibility. Indeed, as Kennedy demonstrates,
Williams thrived in a gendered culture in which conspicuous public
emotion for specific social and political causes had become socially
privileged and in which the nexus between religion, politics, and sensibility
first advanced but later retarded Williams's reputation. Raised as a
Presbyterian, Williams associated with Whigs, Dissenters, and others who
moved in London's progressive circles. Although it was generally
considered improper for a woman to inject herself into "masculine"
matters, Williams' poems, in the 1780s, on the Spanish exploitation of the
Incas and the barbarity of the slave trade (the latter coordinated to coincide
with the debate in Parliament) were uncontroversial subjects, so Williams
could correspond with Robert Burns and meet and be praised by Dr.
Johnson. All sides acclaimed her.
A trip to Paris in the spring of 1790, just as the French Revolution
was electrifying Europe, changed Williams's life forever. Invited by French
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friends to Normandy, Williams spent the summer experiencing the
Revolution, including the famous Parisian Festival of Federation, which
she famously celebrates in the first volume of her hitters. Kennedy
perceptively shows how Williams played her role as an amiable woman of
sensibility who thematically highlighted her emotional response to the
Revolution. Williams hence reinscribed a cultural dichotomy between the
masculine head and the feminine heart, initially exonerating herself from
charges of meddling in revolutionary, "masculine" politics via her natural
and generous, feminine response to the overpowering, affecting Revolu
tion, and Kennedy discusses how contemporary reviews framed the betters
in these specific gendered terms.
After she briefly returned to England, she was publicly appearing with
John Hurford Stone, a wealthy businessman and Dissenter, who was also
conspicuously married. As Kennedy demonstrates, the revolutionary
controversy that she would soon embroil herself in had as much to do with
sexual politics as it did revolutionary politics. Examining letters from
friends and literary luminaries such as Hester Thrale, Anna Seward, and
Horace Walpole, Kennedy crystallixes how Williams's reputation was
incrementally sullied as she continued to commit herself publicly to an
increasingly radical Revolution, returning to France for a stay of two years
that turned out to be the rest of her life.
In chapter 3, Kennedy elucidates Williams's dilemma. Having
committed herself to the Revolution, she was confronted with a series of
events (the September Massacres, the execution of Louis XVI, France's
declaration of war on England) that culminated in the Terror (1793—94)
and the arrest and death of the Girondins, many who were personal friends
of hers. Indeed, the Girondin proscription was the primal event that
caused Williams to turn against theJacobins at considerable risk to herself.
She visited many of her Girondin friends in prison, and her subsequent
anti-Jacobin letters, published in England, put her life in peril. She was, in
fact, briefly imprisoned and was forced to flee to Switzerland in 1794.
Williams rationalized the transformation of her beloved French Revolution
by arguing that the Jacobins had betrayed it. Hence she could maintain a
romantic idea of the prelapsarian 1789 Revolution, which she contrasted
with the concrete Jacobin "counterrevolution."
Kennedy is especially perceptive in analyzing the gender and class
dimensions of WiUiams's bourgeois critique (in which she became
increasingly hostile to lower-class radical women) as well as Williams's
endeavor to rationalize her continued stay in Paris at a time when British
public opinion had turned against the Revolution and her friends in
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England were urging her to return. Kennedy cites heretofore-unpublished
private letters to friends illustrating how Williams was tr^'ing to justify her
continued stay in France at a time when France was fighting against
England and the guillotine was dominating Euro-American news. I Icr
public persona as a woman of sensibility now worked against her as
"sensibility" was being associated, in England, with a transgressivc, radical
perspective.
Kennedy argues that Williams ultimately stayed in France to support
her many French friends, remaining faithful to the Girondin idea, and
hence she sees her dangerous decision as generous and valiant, since it
caused her to lose most of her English friends as well as her public
reputation via English journals that were denouncing and demoniv.ing her
as a woman infected by the French "disease." In the meantime, her serial
hitters, despite the class biases, constituted the most penetrating analysis in
English of the Jacobin Terror. Once the Terror ended, Williams convinced
herself that the Revolution would return to the golden days of '89, and she
remained in France as the faithful English witness of the true French
Revolution.
Chapter 4 deals specifically with Williams's trip to Switzerland with,
among others, John Hurford Stone, who was by this time divorced and
living in the Williams household. In the eighteenth century, Switzerland
was famous for its scenery and democratic cantons, and Kennedy defdy
shows how Williams's descriptions of the scenery were made in the mode
of the sublime and beautiful as she highlighted her emotional impressions
as a wnter of sensibility. Politically, however, her subsequent Tour of
Smt!(erland (1798) was a deconstruction of the myth of Swiss democracy
and a justification for a correspondent French Revolution in the reaction
ary cantons. When French troops actually invaded Switzerland a couple
months after the publication of Tour,Williams could be misrepresented as
actually promoting the French invasion, and, throughout her life,
revolutionary events were continually bumping up against her more
ideaEstic proclamations.
This was also the case with her fleeting infatuation with Napoleon
Bonaparte. Briefly enthralled with theidea of Bonaparte as a great liberator
and personally flattered by him, Williams was, nevertheless, able to see
through his studied deceptions and, consequently, was harassed by his
agents and pressured from pubEshing for approximately ten years. During
this time, Kennedy provides personal snapshots of a feminist WilEams
arguing for equaEty of education, promoting animal rights, and, draped
perpetually in long flowii^ black, mourning the death of her beloved sister
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Cecilia. She also hosted weekly soirees, entertaining French liberals and
international invitees—-something she was able to financially manage when
a mutual French friend cut Stone and her in on a business investment—a
detail Kennedy reveals for the first time.
Her final chapter deals with Williams last years, roughly the postNapoleonic era leading up and through the Restoration. Translating
William von Humboldt's major works, raising Cecilia's two sons, publish
ing poetry and her memoirs, as well as continually recording the unfolding
history of France, in a period when she was basically scraping for money
and confronted with personal tragedies (the deaths of her mother, her halfsister, Persis, and John Hurford Stone), Williams was, until her death in
1827, generous and faithful to both her friends and the ideas of the
Revolution. Still misunderstood and misrepresented in both England and
France, albeit loved and admired by those, like Wordsworth, who
recognized her as the Revolution's English historian, she was the most
perceptive and prescient of all the contemporary Anglo-American
observers of France and its perplexing Revolution.
Kennedy magisterially contextualizes Williams within the vortex of
the revolutionary times she lived through. Her exhaustive examination of
archives, libraries, journals, private collections, and heretofore unpublished
letters, provides new, significant information, and her analysis of this
material provides a deeper; more complex understanding of Williams's
thought and feeling. Her luminous biography illuminates superbly
Williams's achievement and hence her centrality to the revolutionary
debate of which she was the Ur-founding mother.
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Debbie Lee, Slavery and the Romantic Imagination.
Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2002.
Pp. xii + 296.37 illustrations. $60.00.
Reviewed by Joselyn Almeida-Beveridge, Long Island
University
The material, aesthetic, and ideological exchanges that underpin the system
of slavery increasingly have become central considerations when thinking
about a literature produced in the midst of political revolution, British
colonialism, and the emergence of a global consumer market. Debbie Lee
examines just how pervasive the debate regarding slavery and freedom was
from the 1770s to the 183Gs in Slavery and the Bj)mantic Imagination. Drawing
on new historicist, postcolonial, and travel criticism that includes the work
of Felicity Nussbaum, Alan Richardson, Helen Thomas, Moira Ferguson,
Srinivas Aravamudan, Homi Bhabha, Nigel Leask, and Edward Said,
among others, Lee situates canonical authors, texts, and images of the era
in the context of abolitionist, scientific, and travel discourses to argue that
'Tjecause slavery was such an intimate part of the imagination, writers
produced works so distinct that an entire literary period formed around
them" (6).
Lee's ambitious study is organized into four parts: "History and
Imagination," "Hazards and Horrors in the Slave Colonies," "Fascination
and Fear in Africa," and "Facing Slavery in Britain." The first gives a sense
of the scope of the slavery debate, where two major cases—that of James
Sommerset in 1771 and the Zhang case in 1781—^"brought [the issue of
slavery] uncomfortably close to home" (11). The effect of these cases, Lee
argues, was to remove the psychological distance between the British
public and the plight of slaves in the colonies. Indeed, plantation owners
"argued that because of the geographical remoteness of the colonies from
Britain they were absolved of any crimes against Africans" (13). Besides
publicity, the expansion of print culture facilitated the distribution of iconic
images like the interior of a slaving ship, the hrookes, which captured the
"visual horror of the slave trade" (15). Yet the humanitarian activity of
Thomas Clarkson and other abolitionists around this time was undercut by
the zeal for African exploration, embodied in Joseph Banks, whose
influence in gathering scientific data from around the world for commer
cial and colonial purposes becomes apparent from Lee's narrative. While
the abolitionist movement begins to gain ground, scientific exploration
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seeks to open the continent for colonization. Lee reads Mungo Park's
journey as a "shameful legacy" (25) in light of this connection.
The humanitarian impulse, which puts another before the self, and
the colonial one, which expands geographic and epistemological bound
aries, are reflected in the period's aesthetics. Wordsworth's "egotistical
sublime" and Coleridge's "expansive self (30) come to mind; yet "there
also exists, among some writers, an unstoppable desire to see this
expansive British self become not-selfm. the face of the other" (31). Keats's
"negative capability^' is the foremost example of this tendency, and leads
into one of Lee's important ideas: the "distanced imagination" (32). She
derives this theory from Coleridge's and Emmanuel Levinas's concepts of
alterity "to explain how the self tends toward, desires, seeks and needs the
other in order to distinguish itself and realize its subjectivity" (37). Alterity
establishes an ethical relationship with the other, one in which "the only
absolute value is the human possibility of giving the other priority over the
self (Levinas qtd. in Lee 40). Lee calls for a way of reading alterity that
identifies what "happens between the artist/poet and his or her creative
subject," "to read the ethical relationship.. .and then to discuss how these
ethical moments reshape what is being said in other discourses," and "to
accept the possibility of an ethical relationship between the reader and the
trace of the other in representation" (42).
Lee's analyses of familiar texts such as "The Rime of the Ancient
Mariner," 'Frankenstein, "Lamia, and "The Witch of Adas" show how fruitful
this kind of reading can be, and how it illuminates nuances that critical
categories have obscured. In Part Two, "Hazards and Horrors in the Slave
Colonies," Lee demonstrates how Coleridge's abolitionism emerges in
"The Rime of the Ancient Mariner," a poem that dramatizes the collective
guilt of Britain over slavery through the Mariner's contagion and survival
of disease, which Lee reads in the context of the discourses about yellow
fever. The poem shows "the extent to which [Coleridge] was conversant
with the operations of disease and guilt within antislavery literature" (56).
Through his tale, the Mariner "has the important cultural job of bringing
alterity home.. i. The mariner's dramatic and final claim that *He prayeth
best, who loveth best / All things both great and small' is more than a
simple moral to a seafaring tale. It is a lesson about how to relate to what
is other than self (65).
In Part Four; "Facing Slavery in Britain," alterity in the context of
British abolition generates a new reading of Shelley's "Frankenstein, one that
represents the breadth of Lee's scholarship. As she points out, Frankenstein
captured collective guilt and anxiety over slavery to such a degree that in
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a much publicized speech, George Canning "compares the eager-to-be
emancipated slaves to Frankenstein's monster...what has not been
adequately appreciated is the way Shelley's novel literally shaped the
content of debates after 1818" (173). Lee traces the tropes of monstrosity
and cannibalism from their appearance in Montaigne through their
depiction in William Snelgraves's A New Account ofSome Parts of Guinea and
the Slave Trade (1734), Bryan Edwards's Histoty, Civil and Commercial, of the
British W^est Indies (1793), and George Colman's lesser known play. The
Africans
As Lee explains, abolitionist writers like Coleridge, Robert Southey,
and William Roscoe reversed these tropes and charged the British public
with the same monstrosity and cannib^sm they projected onto Africans
and slaves because of their consumption of sugar, which depended on
slavery (177). Cannibalism and consumption also account for theinsatiable
hunger for knowledge that leads Victor to enact the definition of cannibal
ism and "literally remove parts from one body or organization for use in
the construction or repair of a completely different body or organization"
(189). Lee persuades the reader that "the parallels between [Victor]
Frankenstein and British lawmakers are striking" and that "like Franken
stein, [Britons] cannibalized Africans to create some kind of revolutionary,
Promethean power that exceeded its own mastery" (192).
Yet if the distanced imagiaation and alterity create provocative
readings of these works as well as Keats's Tamia and Percy Shelley's "The
Witch of Adas" in Part Three, "Fascination and Fear in Africa," they also
raise questions when applied to nonfictional works Uke Stedmnn's Narrative
and Prince's The History of Maty Prince, a West Indian Slave, Belated ly Herself.
In looking at Blake's engravings for Stedman, Lee juxtaposes Blake's
engravings of humans with those he does of monkeys to suggest a "mockmimicry" of the text. This "mock-mimicry" is also present in The Marriage
of Heaven and Hell "Blake's truth," like Henry Louis Gates' signifying
monkey, "is laced with simian quality of trickiness" (82). Lee argues that
"in both cases, Blake's monkeys mock the deadly conventional aspects of
human society" (85). The violence represented in the Stedman plates,
especially "A Negro Hung Alive by the Ribs to a Gallows" and "Flagella
tion of a Female Samboe Slave," exceeds the limits of "mockery,"
however, and Lee herself acknowledges the difficulty in reading these
images (112). A question that arises here is what happens to the "distanced
imagination" when confronted with bodily suffering as direcdy as it is in
these engravings?
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If "mock-mimicry" strains the reading of Blake's engravings of
Stedman, abortion as a critical conceit places a contrary pressure on
Prince's text Prince interprets an earthquake that happens while she's
being flogged by a Captain I
; as evidence of "the wrath ofJehova," an
interpretation consistent with an enslaved person's religious experience.
Lee continties "Yet here the earth issues forth, not a pillar of salt or a giant
fish, but Prince herself, as a testament to the wickedness of Captain I
and God. Prince thereby portrays herself as the abortive offspring of
British slavery" (215). Lee extends this conceit, arguing that Prince's text
"replicates an actual abortion insofar as the content is raw, embryonic, and
underdeveloped" (216). The relationship between the distanced imagina
tion, alterity, and text as abortion is not entirely clear. Morever, expecta
tions of textual gestation and birth pressed on Prince's text create an
imaginative connection between Victor Frankenstein's "aborted"
experiment of a female mate for the monster and this "aborted" narrative,
one that raises the question of what it means to read Mary Prince's
testimony as a "monstrous" one.
Despite these questions, Lee convinces the reader that a thorough
understanding of the discourses of slavery and abolition are essential to
comprehend the Romantic period, and that writers "necessarily took on
the question of slavery as they put theories of imagination into practice"
(223). Lee's insightful readings and the breathtaking scope of her knowl
edge challenge critics to find models that go beyond the binaries that
inform critical theories of empire and domination. Slavery and the Romantic
Imagination leads the way in this search, transforming the way we think
about power, imagination, literature, and knowledge.
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Stuart Peterfreund, Shelley Among Others: The Play of
the Intertext and the Idea of Language. Baltimore: Johns
Hopkins University Press, 2002. Pp. xiii + 406. $55.00.
Reviewed by Kim Wheatleyy College of William and
Mary
The title of Stuart Peterffeund's book. Shelly Among Others, refers to two
of the kinds of intertextuai conversation that Shelley's poetry participates
in—one with earlier language theorists and one with major poetic
precursors such as Shakespeare and Milton. Peterfreund also offers a
wealth of references to other canonical Romantic poets, especially
Wordsworth, but his book ultimately focuses more on the dialogues within
and among Shelley's poems themselves. Peter&eund sets out to join those
critics who have concentrated on Shelley's ideas about language, such as
John W Wright's Shelley's Myth of Metcsphor
of Georgia Press,
1970), Richard Cronin's Sheila's Poetic Thoughts (St. Martin's, 1981), and
WiUiam Keach'sSheila's Style (Methuen,1984). Despite occasional mention
of Romantic-era historical events, the book's chief emphasis is on how
Shelley's poetry charts the "drama" of the "individual mind" seeking or
failing to understand the power of language (45). Peter&eund also follows
in the footsteps of critics who have explored the interplay between
Shelley's skepticism and his idealism, notably Jerrold E. Hogle's Sbelly's
Process (Oxford University Press, 1988) and William A. Ulmer's Shellyan
Eros (Princeton University Press, 1990). His account of Shelley's oeuvre,
while not as exhaustive as Hogle's, is more comprehensive than most, and
gives valuable attention to relatively underexplored poems such as The
Revolt of Islam, Prince Athanase, and Posalind and Helen. The book's main
strength lies in its sustained engagement with the big questions that draw
many readers to Shelley in the first place: the relationship between a
"transcendent first cause" (233) on the one hand, and "evanescent natural
process" (78) on the other, and the extent to which poetic language can
attain "knowledge of the transcendent" (88).
A rather stiff introduction placesShelley's ideas aboutlanguage in the
context of the "New Philology," discussions about the origins and
functions of language by Vico, Herder, and Rousseau. This is the most
difficult part of the book to read because it is not yet clear what is at stake
in examining Shelley's debt to these language theorists. The point seems to
be that "reading backward" (16)—as opposed to &om a postmodern
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perspective—^locates Shelley in a tradition that aligns "the play of poetic
language" with what Peterffeund calls the "workings of providence" (17).
Chapter One, on Shelley's own ideas about language, provides a fuller
introduction to the assumptions underlying the book as a whole. In this
chapter, Peterfreund foregrounds Shelley's belief in the renovating power
of poetry, its ability to renew language and thus "perception" (10).
Peterffeund relies heavily on the familiar passage from^l Defence ofPoetiy
in which Shelley calls the language of poets "vitally metaphorical; that is,
it marks the before unapprehended relations of things, and perpetuates
their apprehension, tintil the words which represent them, become through
time signs for portions or classes of thoughts instead of pictures of integral
thoughts; and then if no new poets should arise to create afresh the
associations which hkve been thus disorganized, language will be dead to
all the nobler purposes of human intercourse" (26). The idea that poetry's
imaginative use of metaphor helps to bring and keep the world alive is
central to Peterfreund's argument. A sense of language's ability to deaden
is equally central. Although Wright takes the opposite of metaphor to be
dead metaphor, Peterfreund takes the opposite to be metonymy, which he
claims has the power to harden and reify oppressive ways of thinking,
including belief in a knowable God. TTiis distinction dominates the
majority of his readings. Metonymy is definitely the villain of this book
while metaphor is the good guy—along with hope, love, poetry and the
imagination.
Peterfreund's first chapter offers a persuasive reading of "The Mask
of Anarchy" as "Shelley's most succinct characterization of what it is like
to live in a world 'naturalized' by means of a metonymically driven
catechism that subjects everyonein tiiat world—the poem's speaker no less
than the oppressed masses of which he speaks—to its powerful influence"
(34). Peterffeund thus modifies Ulmer's point that metonymy challenges
Shelley's idealization of metaphor. For Ulmer, metonymy, which he lines
up with allegory as characterized in Paul de Man's "Rhetoric of Temporal
ity," reflects the tendency of language to disperse truth into endlessly
different permutations. For Peterffeund, by contrast, access to the
(unknowable) truth—or truths—that can be glimpsed through metaphor
is threatened by metonymy's insistence on making causal connections. An
example comes in his reading of Asia's speech about Prometheus's gift of
knowledge in Act II of Prometheus Unbound (41). Peterffeund takes the
phrase "marble grew divine" (II, iv, 82) to suggest a religion that is
fetishistic and reifying. (He makes much of the image of living things
turning to stone, coimecting patriarchy with "pettiarch]^" [43].) Hogle's key
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term, transference, the refusal to stay still that for Hogle is Shelley's
ultimate ideal, thus seems opposed to rather than continuous with
metonymy as Peterffeund understands it—as he confirms by referring to
"transferential" metaphor (100). Although he concedes along the way that
the difference between the two can be deconstructed, Peterfreund
separates out metaphor and metonymy for the purposes of his unfolding
argument. In the first half of the book his application of the distinction
yields some fcesh readings of the poetry, while in the second half, the terms
seem to become increasingly confining.
Peterfreund's patient and illuminating reading of^^^rin his second
chapter addresses Shelley's critique of the later Wordsworth for falling into
the trap of using metonymy instead of metaphor, mistaking contingency
(nature, the human mind) for an absolute. Peterffeund offers a dark
iuterpretation of the poet figure: "If the Wordsworthian narrator missays
or unsays the pre-ExOTm<?» Wordsworth, the SheUeyan Poet-subject enacts
the transgressions that the narrator speaks" (68). He accepts Tilottama
Rajan's view of the poet's death as a "negation both of the ordinary and of
the visionary" (99)—-a negation requiring, according to Peterfreund, a
"recuperation of voice" (99) that he goes on to explore in his analysis of
"Mont Blanc" in Chapter Three. The "lesson of "Mont Blanc,"' he
contends, is to renounce "willful naming-to-totalize" (133). As Peterffeund
is of course aware, this is easier said than done. His next chapter, on The
Revolt of Islam, claims that for Shelley, "language's potential for doing harm
is limited if its materiality is foregrounded" (154). Although Peterffeund
makes a strong case for the sophistication of The Revolt, he concludes,
returning to Rajan's distinction apropos oiAlastor, that Shelley fails in this
poem to hold the historical and the visionary together. The next turn in his
argument finds a "retheorixation" in Shelley's work whereby the poet
acknowledges more ffdly that metaphor and metonymy are bound up
(169).
In Chapter Five, Peterffeund conffonts a number of "troubled texts"
(169)—Prince Athanase, Rosalind and Helen, Lines Written among the Euganean
Hills, and Julian and Maddalo—^in which Shelley kills off his earlier more
visionary ethos in order to create a "new poetic voice" (169). This chapter
emphasizes Shelley's experimentation with genres, claiming that the poet
has to move beyond the "personal lyric" because it is "the wrong form for
engaging specific, historically situated social issues" (173). Peterffeund sees
the eclogue, represented by both Rosalind and Helen and Julian and Maddalo,
as a transitional genre that looks forward to the dialogism of Prometheus
Unbound and The Cenci (181). In Rosalind and Helen,"the fate of dialogism.
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emblematized by the presumed eternal dialogue of the two lilest' dead
fiiends, is too pat, too easy" (20V). Julian andMaddalo, by contrast, is better
able to address the "historical present" (200) because of its "generic
hybridization" (201). The Maniac's speech offers a bleak account of
entrapment within "the dead, metonymic language of human history"
(214); the Maniac therefore is "the type of a failed poet who must be cast
off by Shelley if he is to embrace the vitally metaphorical language of
poetry, espouse the dialogical, and aspire to poetic greatness" (217). The
latter aspiration is addressed in Peterfreund's final chapter. Meanwhile, his
penultimate chapter reads Prometheus Unbound and The Cenci as attempts to
look "outside" and "inside" history—the triumph of metaphor versus the
triumph of metonymy—or, as Peterfreund puts it, "going with the flow"
versus "going with the woe" (243).
In his last chapter Peterfreund shifts to Shelley's concern that he
himself would deteriorate into a mere "metonym" (266) for his poetry.
This chapter thus deals not with the question of whether it is possible to
step outside history (as in Prometheus Unbound) but with the question of
whether one can step outside literary history. Peterfreund identifies a "line
of poetry" from "Ode to the West Wind" to The Triumph of Life that
"enacts a romance of dematerialization" (266)—that is to say, "the fantasy
of losing one's material identity but not her or his transcendent and
immaterial meaning" (268). Peterfreund sees The Triumph ofUfe as more
aware than Epipsyehidion and Adonais that metonymy threatens to take over
all "human existence" (46). Yet the book ends on a note of hope rather
than gloom, perhaps implying that Shelley's enduring fame is a vital
metaphor of, rather than a mere metonym for, transcendence. The
connections that Peterfreund draws between texts, Shelleyan and other
wise, tend to be more compelling than his overarching argument. Thus, the
best part of his discussion of Adonais deals with the elegy's Keatsian
intertexts. At one point he reads "Mont Blanc" via King Lear filtered
through Wordsworth. Peterfreund suggestively links the motif of unveiling
in Epipsjchi<Uon back to the "fetishism" oiAlastor (211). Such connections
might have been reinforced by closer attention to the details of his
quotations, prose as well as poetry. Lines from Shelley's prefaces and the
Defence of Poetry are too often dropped into the discussion as if they are selfexplanatory. (This observation also applies to Peterfreund's use of theorists
and critics, old as well as new.) Such a tendency is particularly problematic
where the Defence is concerned because, despite his strong sense of
development within Shelley's career, Peterfreund usually applies that text
diachronically to the poetry. Nevertheless, I admire Peterfreund's refusal
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to let go of Shelley's idealism. So, for example, he refers to the "use of
poetic language as thevehicle of temporary transcendence" (60) even while
he later admits that "language cannot enact transcendence either for its
author or for its audience" (144). Yet Peterffeund, arguably like Shelley
himself, never loses his "faidi" (317) that the power of poetic language
exceeds its limitations.

Eric Gidal, Poetic Exhibitions: Romantic Aesthetics and
the Pleasures of the British Museum, Lewisburg: Bucknell University Press, 2001. Pp. 284. $45.00.
Reviewed by DidierMaleuvre, University ofCalifornia,
Santa Barbara
The natural mood of museums blends triumph and nostalgia: triumph
because museums valiandy preserve the relics of past eras, nostalgia
because in the end they cannot stem the flow of time. Every object saved
&om oblivion speaks of a time irrevocably out of reach. Victory and rout,
construction and destruction,acquisition and loss—this is the dialectic that
modulates Eric Vidal's study of Romantic and Victorian meditations on the
British Museum. The museum is an unsteady totem of national identifica
tion. On the one hand, it trumpets a nation's imperial reach, its wealth, its
power to attract and collect and survey; on the other, it monumentalizes
a general failure to either own up to the past or live up to the past. Either,
as in the Elgin Marbles affair, the exhibition of ancient Greek statuary
seems the loot of an upstart nation wresting native artifacts away from
their hallowed source. Or else the glories of the past outshine the
achievements of the modern age and induce weariness and latecomer
angst. Or, again, the mind-boggling choices and fiats that organize museum
exhibitions cause doubt, second-guess, debate. Now history and civilization
are, not bastions of certainty, but revisionist Hmbo.
The author of PoeticExhibitionsis interested in showing how Romantic
perceptions of the British Museum recount a larger tale of national glories
and anxieties. Reading guidebooks, journalistic testimonies, and curatorial
pieces alongside the great poetry of the Romantic period, Gidal explains
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how the modern British nation staked out its historical identity by
discussing, arguing, and reflecting on the newly founded museum—^its
acquisitions and holdings, its order, its architectural design, but also its
popular access, its admissions policy, its educational mission, etc. Thovjgh
sharing the conviction that museums are places of ideological control
(roughly speaking, a place that tells people who they should be, what they
should vjJue, and what they should think), Gidal refreshingly announces
that he is only partly sympathetic to the pungendy Marxist school of
criticism that regards "all aesthetic expressions as always and already
compromised by the dominant ideology of any given societ/' (27). In
defiance of cultural materialism, the author pens an introduction that
insists on the liberating thrust of aesthetic experience, one capable of
breaking through the social armature to open vistas of thinking, pleasure,
and perception unscripted by ideology. Aesthetic culture, he assures, is not
always social repression in disguise; the museum is not on a par with the
school, the prison, the reformatory, and the other bogeys of the Foucauldian universe. For art inspires a wealth of reactions that may yet untie the
mental straightjacket put on us by our social conditioning.
This is welcome news, though curiously the book does not seem
much inclined to follow its promise. None of the subsequent chapters
shows interest in investigating the liberating force of private aesthetic
experience. This may be a failure of nerve (to defend the transcending
power of art over ideology challenges the ruling doctrine of many EngEsh
Departments); or it covdd be that the materk^t reduction is so deeply
engrained or conveniendy irresistible that it wins over even those that beg
to differ. Whichever the case, the readings that Poetic Exhibitions offers do
not fulfiU the author's hope of "avoidjmg] estabEshingan inherent relation
between aesthetic theory and ideological deployment^' (28). In theory, the
book beEeves that aesthetic pleasure is not "so easily contained" by "moral
and patriotic ends" (49); in practice, it shows Etde inclination for reading
Romantic poetry and aesthetics in the light of Eberation. At best, Gidal
does show that, by virtue of a semantic waywardness inherent in Eterature,
some poems end up intimating messages that vary sEghdy fi:om their stated
aim (thus an ode to the museum mayweE deconstructively hide some deep
skepticism about curatorial preservation and national vanity). But at no
point does the author seem tempted to read Romantic Eterature away from
the lamp of ideology.
Thus for instance his ruEng on one of Europe's greatest poets;
"Wordsworth's poetic maneuvers maybe seen tocorrespond.. .with modes
of ideological identification enacted in sites of pubEc exhibition" (79).
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There, in the nutshell, is the book's chosen critical method, which absorbs
the particular into the general; hardly a poem is found that fails to be an
emissary of a larger group mind; har^y a private aesthetic experience that
does not replicate or announce the political and ideological protocols of
society. Nor does the chapters' automatic pairing of the "imaginative" and
the "ideological" or of the "individual" and the "national" leave doubt as
to which half of the twins controls the other. To the author of this book,
poetry is interesting so long as it enacts sociological protocols. The private
is really public; the individual is a case of the general; the inner is an aspect
of the outer. This habit of generalizing or, more exacdy, sociali^ng the
particular yields interesting insights on occasion. Most often it leads to
conclusions that are either forced or dubiously useful. For instance: on the
commonsense notion that the British Museum is a symbol of the nation
(there is a reason why they call the museum British), the author argues that
the mind-boggling diversity of the collections, the teeming clutter, the
taxonomic vertigo and the arbitrary divisions—^that all this will reflect on
the nation in such a manner that it, too, wiU seem (in the jargon) "a
sublime object of desire" (74) or ^ plain language) an ideal unattainable
unity. This, in my view, overstates the slippage between the particular and
the general. Who, walking out of the British Museum in 1850, is likely to
be haunted by the thought that the nation is a sublime object of desire? Or
that the failure of aesthetic composition intra muros portends the unreach
able ideality of the nation at large? No country was ever made or unmade
by a museum; nor do nations collapse from a case of museum fatigue. I
wish not to make light of the author's point but merely to suggest that the
habit of tying the artistic particularity to the ideological generality is not the
finest of critical instruments. For one, it leads to the ambivalent stance of
both overstating and belittling literature; it overstates it through the habit
of blowing up the small emotional tremor of a poem or private reflection
to the size of full ideological earthquake; and it belittles it with the
unshakable conviction that a work of literature is in the end but a dutiful
product of the Zeitgeist Of course a work of art or literature is branded by
its historical context. Just for that, however, it is not reducible to its native
situation, nor does its significance consist only in its ideological birthplace.
Up the chain of causes behind this common bias of contemporary criticism
is theidealist fallacy which consists in equating art with representation—or
at any rate to assume that the gist of an artistic work is to represent; hence
that its interest is non-artistic or worldly.
This widespread critical assumption is somewhat distressing to note
ia Poetic Exhibitions because its author is in fact sensitive to the ways in
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which art criticism often drcumvents the hard job of attending to the
sensuous form of objects—^the ways in which museum discomse "subli
mates" works of art;
The Guide consistently converts objects into signs, pointing
either towards ideal beauty..or towards sublime power [...].
In both instances, the materiality of the objects is transformed
or passed through in the interest of rhetorical reflection.
Converting them to signs not only denies them their physical
presence, but also diminishes any sense of their intrinsic power,
allowing the viewing subject a potent agency in the aesthetic
encounter. (185)
This observation soundly denounces the intellectualizing avoidance of art.
To convert artworks into sign-posts, Gidal argues, diminishes the inherent
force and lesson of aesthetic encounter. If this is so—^and this reader is
inclined to think so—one wonders what failure of self-reflection caused
the author of Poetic Exhibitions to commit similar "sublimation" on the
poetic pieces under examination. For to reduce poetry to social semantics
is also a form of aesthetic avoidance. Gidal charges the poet (in this
instance Keats) with pulling upward, away from the object and into the
realm of "idealization" (189). Ifls corrective, however, is not to study the
object (that is, the poem) but to pull downward, into the ideological
inftastructure, the ubiquitous ooze from which, he assumes, every cultural
product originates and to which it must return under the critic's baton.The
poems simply disappear as poetry; they are no longer sign-posts of an ideal
reality but rather of a materialist substratum. The result is in the end the
same: artworks are just mouthpieces. "The Pleasures of the British
Museum," as the subtitle heralds, are as dimly felt as the pleasures of
poetry. They are silenced by political disquisition.
Those social lectures would be welcome if they brought fresh ideas.
On the whole, however, the readings of this volume do not cause wonder.
Their dynamic is simple: museum pieces are objects that enable fantasies
of national identification; but the poems that celebrate these pieces sing
more of loss, nostalgia, and melancholic distance, which somewhat
dampens the triumphant mood of curatorial appropriation. Gidal's
contribution is to claim that the process of remembrance assumes, or
"inscribes itself in," the loss of the object remembered. This is a piece of
self-evidence on which a great heap of involute scholastic rhetoric piles up
the illusion of profundity. The last two chapters in particular read as
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though they mean to confound, rather than instruct, the reader. Simple
thoughts are tortured to fit into awkward arabesques of academic argot,
twists and tangles of a needlessly technical language that conveys little with
a maximum grammatical exertion. This is a great pity because a literary
critic is one who, by training, should be wary of letting his range of
thinking be hostage to an idiom. For the critic's task is not to follow a
rhetoric of criticism but to be critical of all rhetoric—^including, and
especially, the one that fetters his thinking.

*

Alan Charles Kors, Editor in Chief, Encyclopedia of the
Enlightenment. 4 vols. New York: Oxford University
Press, 2003. Pp. xxxi + 430 + 449 + 497 + 471. $495.00.
Reviewed by Irwin PiimeVy Rutg^s UniversityNewark Campus
[EDITORS' NOTE: We commissioned this review aware that
Professor Primer is one of the 460 distinguished scholars who
contributed articles to this Encyclopedia.]
The strongest justification offered for this new encyclopedia of the
Enlightenment (as we learn from its Preface) is that "Ae past two
generations of scholarship have witnessed an explosion in new claims of
knowledge about the thought, culture, and context of the Enlightenment,
claims that are now indispensable to an informed understanding of this
vast historical phenomenon." Proceeding on this assumption, the editors
commissioned 460 scholars of recognized accomplishment in their diverse
fields to write approximately 700 articles, each of which is signed.
Extending the value of all of these articles are a number of ancillary
features, including (1) a "Topical Outline of Articles," with major headings
and subheadings; (2) an extraordinary index of names and subjects that
occupies 177 pages—^with three columns of entries per page—at the end
of volume four; (3) a separate annotated bibliography for each article; and
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(4) a useful list of cross references ("See also..at the end of almost all
of these articles.
The editors intended from the outset that this encyclopedia would not
be merely an updated collection of biographical articles. Alan Charles Kors,
the editor in chief, succinctly summaries their broader plan:
The Encyclopedia presents the history of Enlightenment
studies; the political geography of the Enlightenment; the
agencies and spaces of the Enlightenment (the world of the
book; salons, academies, journals, and diverse gatherings);
reading publics and receptions of the Enlightenment
(popularizers, appropriators, and critics); the thought of the
Enlightenment (essential debates and concepts; significant
schools and movements of thought; major authors; and the
impact of the Enlightenment upon religion, philosophy,
politics, science, economics, law, the arts, and efforts of
improvement); and the legacy of the Enlightenment.
(1: xx-xxi)
No longer can this period or movement be seen simply as a secularist,
deistic or atheistic revolt from traditional religious authority, supporting
toleration, buttressed by a new faith in reason and experimental method,
and supported by major advances in scientific knowledge. It includes more
than that because Enlightenment issues (it is argued) have been found
"precisely in the received traditions and debates of the orthodox learned
world that preceded and coexisted with the would-be innovators." It is no
longer commonly agreed "that any increase in 'secularixation' or 'natural
ism' necessarily entailed a corresponding decrease in religiosity or supernaturalism" (xviii).
The main reason for not calling this work the En(yclopedia of the
Enlightenment and the Counter-Enlightenment—^which it arguably is—is that
most of the articles deal with Enlightenment subjects while fewer articles
discuss figures or groups who opposed the anticlerical and anti-Christian
sentiments often voiced by the philosophes. Though it was wise, and
necessary, to include such counter-Enlightenment articles, it is probably
impossible to arrive at a balance that would please all readers. In our time
the Enlightenment as a movement with a core of liberal values and socio
political goals has come to be disparaged from a variety of positions that
include postmodernism and religious conservatism and fundamentalism.
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One strategy employed by counter-Enlightenment writers today is to
insinuate that the En%htenment came and went, and is no longer a living
force This attitude is reflected in the title of R. C. Bardetfs book The Idea
of Enlightenment: A Post-Mortem Stuc^ (University of Toronto Press, 2001).
If the Enlightenment was dead by 2001, then was this encyclopedia already
a corpse when it was published two years later? The answer, of course, is
that no matter how often it is killed off and buried, the Enlightenment
survives as a vital historical field of study, as a living set of values and as a
site of vigorous debate and contention,^^lien GeorgeW Bush was elected
for a second term as President of the United States, Garry Wills expressed
his dismay in a New York Times Op Ed piece (4 November 2004) titled
"The Day the Enlightenment Went Out." Most of the contributors to this
encyclopedia probably believe that the core values of the Enlightenment
are still desirable and still operative in modern advanced societies.
The best way for the uninitiated to follow these two strands is to
begin with two key articles that sketch the historical development of both
positions: "Enlightenment Studies" by Lynn Hunt (with Margaret Jacob),
and "Counter-Enlightenment" by Sylviane Albertan-Coppola. In what is
designated as the "principal article" of this collection. Hunt and Jacob
present a concentrated survey of the course of Enlightenment ideas and
writings organi2ed in four cluronological stages. They trace the metaphor
of light and illumination only as far back as Lord Shaftesbury in 1700 but
carry their story well beyond the almost complete "disappearance of the
Enl^htenmenl?' in nineteenth-century thought. Enlightenment studies
were revived after France became a republic in 1870 and in the twentieth
century were notably advanced ^ opposition to fascist thought) by Ernst
Cassirer, Paul Haxard, Franco Venturi, and Peter Gay. They continue with
negative assessments of the Enlightenment by Theodor Adorno and Max
Horkheimer, Michel Foucault, and a number of feminist critics who
extended the negative critique from feminist perspectives, and conclude
that all of these recent assaults upon the Enlightenment only confirm its
"centrality to Western narratives of modernity."
Readers who consult "Enlightenment Studies" before turning to the
complementary article "Counter-Enlightenment" wdl find that the Hunt/
Jacob survey also includes some of the best-known authors and publicists
of the Counter-En%htenment. These figures are examined in greater detail
in Albertan-Coppola's article on that subject, which begins with the
important observation that "the boundary between enlightened men of
letters and adversaries of the Enlightenment is not so easily established as
is generally believed." She proceeds to show that detractors of the
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Enlightenment often shared an admiration for ancient classical authors and
for modern science with their opponents, and that they came gradually to
champion reason and social utility. The simple antagonisms of yesteryear
can no longer be accepted as the truth of history. She affirms, finally, that
the new field of Counter-Enlightenment studies is still under construction
and well worthy of scholarly attention.
Thus, one of the broader contributions of this work is to temper
what some regard as the whiggish bias of earlier surveys of the Enlighten
ment and the rise of toleration. The earlier tendency to see the Enlighten
ment narrowly as die product of the West's intellectual elite is now also
modified by the view that popular culture and "the people" made
significant contributions to this movement
One of the dangers of broadening the boundaries of the Enlighten
ment is that the sense of its meaning something particular or definite may
vanish. This is suggested in a few passages where "the Enlightenment" is
virmally coterminous with the long eighteenth century. On theother hand,
the editor in chiefs preface does make it clear that not every article will
reflect the ideological values of the Enlightenment, and that counterEnlightenment views were also solicited for this reference work. This
explains why, in addition to the expected articles on Diderot, Voltaire,
D'Alembert, Rousseau, Hume, Godwin and Tom Paine, we also find
articles on Noel-Antoine Pluche, the abbe Bergier, Cardinal de PoHgnac,
Bishop Bossuet, Archbishop Fenelon, and the Oratorians. The writings of
these (mosdy) clerical authors were widely read and known by the partisans
of Enlightenment, as were those by many other Christian authors. In the
case of Fenelon it is claimed that his view of the self differed significandy
firom earlier formulations, and we are reminded that "the great thinkers of
the Enlightenment" admired this man and his writings. Bergier, we learn,
voiced revisionary ideas on salvation while opposing Rousseau and deism
and atheism. As for the article on the Oratorians, it is certain that they
made an important contribution to religious education in seventeenth- and
eighteenth-century France, but how they relate to the Enlightenment is not
entirely clear.
In order to redefine the Enlightenment from the perspective of
conflicting ideological and critical positions, the editors also solicited
articles on Jiirgen Habermas, Ernst Cassirer, Reinhart Koselleck, the
Frankfurt School (including Adorno and Horkheimer), and PostStructuralism and Post-Modernism. And since the editors also chose to
include articles on the British Isles, France, North America, Latin America,
Switzerland, Hungary, Greece, Austria, Scandinavia, etc, and on cities such
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as Berlin, Amsterdam, Edinburgh, Naples, and Geneva, it is not at all
surprising to find that a number of desirable biographical entries had to be
excluded. (Kors and his editors knew in advance that criticisms like those
that follow would be voiced.)
One of the most egregious omissions is an important pair of British
authors. Sir John Trenchard and Thomas Gordon, whose periodical essays
in The Independent Whig and Cato's Tetters exerted a broad transatlantic
influence on political thinkers in their century. True, they are named
together in at least six passages in this work (as the Index shows), but they
deserve more detailed exposition. Another person who might well have
merited a separate article is the important geologist who boldly extended
the age of the universe backwards and forwards and formulated the
Plutonian theory of rock formation, James Hutton. Two women writers
who merit but do not have their own separate articles are the so-called
"Republican Virago," Catharine Macaulay, and Helen Maria Williams,
whose reports about French Revolutionary politics in the 1790s were
widely read on both sides of the Atlantic. Macaulay is briefly present in
these four volumes, with two references in the Index, but Williams appears
to have been completely forgotten. Also absent from the Index entirely is
Catherine Trotter Cockburn, who wrote learnedly on Locke's philosophy
early in the eighteenth century. The one appearance of Antonio VaUisneri
in the Index leads us to a passage where heis named as a journalist, but the
importance of his work as a scientist, particularly on biological generation,
is unfortunately overlooked.
Perhaps it would have been useful to have been given (at the outset,
or in an appendix) a list of significant authors and subjects that do not
appear as separate articles? Thus we would know that Anna Letitia
Barbauld and Ann Yearsley, while having some significance in Enlighten
ment studies, were deliberately excluded. Other omissions are Ann
Radcliffe, Robert Bage,John Thdwall,John Cleland and William Beckford.
On the other hand we do find articles devoted to the famous males; Defoe,
Fielding, Richardson, Smollett, and Sterne (the big five British novelists);
Boswell, Johnson and Goldsmith; and Marivaux, Marmontel, Prevost,
Laclos and Sade. Less attention, in general, is accorded to the dramatists
in this period. For artists we have articles on Hogarth, Gainsborough,
David, and Angelica Kauffman, but not on Reynolds, Fuseli, Gillray, or
Vigee-Lebrun.
If the chronological boundaries were roughly meant to be 1670
through 1815, that would raise the problem of how to deal with the greater
Romantic authors. There is indeed a skillful overview of the Romantic
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movement, but no individual articles for Blake, Wordsworth, Coleridge,
Byron, Keats, or Shelley. One might argue that a few of these writers are
more important for an understanding of the Enlightenment than is
Bossuet, but it is fairly obvious that the Romantic movement in general,
born in the era of the Enlightenment, was regarded by the editors as a limit
beyond which they would not deeply venture Still there is always an
exception: Goethe (who died in 1832) does appear in a separate article
Admirable and freshly informative as this expanded approach is, it is
not completely satisfactory insofar as certain broad subjects fail to appear,
or fail to coalesce Thus any reader who hopes to find a unified article on
the church and the Enlightenment will be disappointed. In the complete
list of articles, none begins with the word "church," so Church of England
as the name of an article is absent. If we try another path, say "Anglican
ism," we again find no article with that name. But if we turn to the index,
there under "Anglicanism" we find dozens of references to that church, its
personnel, its theology, and so forth. But shouldn't there have been,
somewhere among the articles, an account of important interrelations
between the Anglican Church and the Enlightenment? The answer is yes,
and such an account does appear within the article titled "National
Churches." What is needed in such a case is a fuller use of "blind entries,"
those potential article tides that lead the reader to the actual headword used
in this encyclopedia. To be sure, more about Anglicanism does appear in
the article "Latitudinarianism," which is also referenced under Anglicanism
in the index.
Possibly the most interesting omission from the list of topics is
"primitivism." This omission I would link with another, the deliberate
exclusion of A. O. Lovejoy and George Boas from this encyclopedia's
"principal article," its survey of "Enlightenment Studies." Lovejoy and
Boas were the most eminent scholars in the history-of-ideas group at Johns
Hopkins earlier in the last century and both were contemporaries of
Cassirer and Hazard, who are well-remembered in this encyclopedia.
Lovejoy, at least, surely merited some recognition here for his still useful
contributions. By the1960s, if not earlier, theassumptions and methodolo
gies of the history-of-ideas approach began to be discredited, but the
impact of their work still survives. By excluding "primitivism" entirely
from his fine discussion of 'Trogress," David Spadafora confirms the
tendency to separate these two concepts which had earlier been found to
be closely interrelated. But in fact "primitivism and progress" appear to be
alive and well in various history and literature courses (as the Internet tells
us), and for an excellent recent article utilizing this pair of concepts I
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recommend Luke Gibbons's '"Subtilized into Savages': Edmund Burke,
Progress, and Primitivism" (SAQ, Winter 2001). It is only fair to add that
the index does include fourteen citations under "primitivism," one of
which is the following: 'Tart of Diderot responded strongly to the call of
'primitivism,' and he became increasingly preoccupied with the destruction
of nature caused by European colonial expansion." Walter Rex uses this
term precisely because it fits and he is confident that his mainly academic
audience will understand what he is saying. Omitting "primitivism" from
the list of important topics was, I think, ill-advised. The articles "Colonial
ism," "Native Americans," and some others simply do not convey the rich
meanings and associations that "primitivism" came to have, registering an
esteem or love for some aspects of the past, especially a golden age, that
appears so often in eighteenth-century writing.
In the complete Hst of articles no article is listed for Rene Descartes,
which would seem surprising for this particular encyclopedia. A blind entry
for Descartes would have been very useful, for the reader would then be
directed to the ample discussion of his philosophy in the article
"Cartesianism." There is perhaps a specific advantage in such an instance
for the author (T. Verbeek) insofar as calling the article "Cartesianism"
permits him to dispense with the biographical details and to move
immediately to a discussion of Descartes's philosophy and its reception
during the ensuing two centuries. This strategy, however, is not uniformly
employed throughout, for we find that "Spinozism" is a bUnd entry that
sends us to 'Tantheism" and to "Spinoza, Baruch de." On the other hand,
we find a substantial entry for "Newton, Isaac" followed by a slightly
longer article on "Newtonianism," each composed by a different author.
Whoever hopes to find a single comprehensive article on women in
the Enlightenment in this collection will be disappointed. But of course
much information about women in that age and movement can be found
in articles on feminist theory, midwifery, salons, sexuality, pornography, the
education of women, and in at least thirty more articles devoted to
important women such as Mary Wortley Montagu, Aphra Behn, Acade
Phyllis Wheatley, Madame de La Fayette, Germaine N. de Stael, Olympe
de Gouges, Mary Astell, and Mary Wollstonecraft. If one were unaware of
the importance of Poullain de La Barre, one would possibly miss an article
on a figure who is famous in the history of debates on women. This
suggests why it is important for the reader to consult not only the opening
list of articles but also the detailed index, where Poullain de La Barre
appears not only in his proper alphabetical location but also among the
entries under the topic "Women." This topic in the index includes more
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than fifty references, and these are followed by index entries for "women's
education," "women's rights," and "women writers," each one sending us
to at least two dozen passages. Nor do these entries exhaust the presence
of women in this index: another sixty or more references are assembled
under the heading of "gender," and Poullain is again listed. But the strong
interest and productivity in gender studies in the last few decades is
perhaps not sufficiently represented or tapped in this encyclopedia.
The closest thing to an overarching entry on women and the
Enlightenment in these four volumes can be found in two articles;
"Feminist Theory" and "Men and Women of Letters." The latter title is
deceptive because most of the article focuses upon important women
writers in the Enlightenment. In that article much space is given to
WoUstonecraft, but we also find that "women of letters" in this article
literally means women who write letters. Much space is also given to
WoUstonecraft in "Feminist Theory," and what would an encyclopedia of
the EnUghtenment be without a separate article devoted to her?—^which
indeed we find here. This raises the question of duplications and repeti
tions of subject matter, a problem that the editors were weU aware of. Kors
teUs us that the editors buUt into this encyclopedia what they caU "a
creative redundancy," so that in certain cases where the same or similar
material is discussed, one presentation may be much superior to another.
This can be seen in the case of WoUstonecraft who is reviewed in the three
articles. It is almost poindess to ask which reading of her career and her
importance is better; we profit from reading aU of them.
On the subject of women in the EnUghtenment it should be noted
that we do find articles on "SexuaUty" and 'Tomography"in this coUection
but none on gender smdies, lesbianism, tribadism, or homosexuaUty. The
importance of changing views on marriage is also sighted, unless the
reader imagines that a dozen scattered references to marriage (and none on
polygamy) wiU do justice to this rich subject. Nor do we find a single
reference to adultery recorded in the Index. This may remind us that this
encyclopedia contains an article on "Virtue," but none on vice. (Was the
theory of virtue advancing whUe ideas about vice remained unchanged?)
Pornography may have originated in the terms pornosgraphos used first by
Athenaeus, but the article on this subject does not linger on whores or
prostitutes, except perhaps in mentioning MandeviUe's proposal to regulate
and decriminalize prostitution and Restif de la Bretonne's elaboration of
this idea in his tract Ije Pornographe. FuUer discussions of prostitution,
marriage and adultery would have been desirable in adding more substance
to the various treatments of society and social issues.
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In a few instances the opening list of articles should probably have
delivered more information about persons who shared the same name. It
is impossible to tell which "Archibald Campbell" named in this list will
really be discussed, and only when we turn to the article itself do we learn
that its subjectis the third duke of Argyll (1682—1761) who as a patron was
instrumental in furthering the Scottish Enlightenment. Three other
Archibald Campbells are indexed in the one-volume O.S.A. edition of
Boswell's Ufe ofJohnson. One of those three was the author of an extensive
reply to MandeviUe's Fable of the Bees in 1728. In the case of "La Rochefou
cauld, Franfois de," five of the six references listed in the index are to the
famous author of the Maximesvsho lived from 1613 to1680, but one of the
references is really to his descendant, the Due de la RochefoucauldLiancourt (1747—1827) who as an emigre visited England and the United
States and published travel books recording his transatlantic experiences.
The audior of the article on Erasmus Darwin thinks that The Botanic Garden
and The Temple of Nature were composed in Miltonic blank verse, when in
fact their verse form is the heroic couplet in the manner of Pope. Likewise
the suggestion that Darwin wrote "a neoclassical heroic epic" is simply
misinformation, but the social history and history-of-science aspects of this
article are quite reliable.
These few instances can probably be classified as minor corrections,
and in a work with so many authors and articles it is almost certain that
more minor faults will be found. Nevertheless neither these faults nor the
omissions named above will alter the fact that this encyclopedia is a
goldmine for scholars workingin this field and for all others who may have
an occasional need for the information it offers.
Another feature of this encyclopedia—the distinction between major
and minor figures—deserves to be considered. There are few surprises or
unfamiliar materials in the articles on the majors—^Voltaire, Rousseau,
Diderot, Montesquieu, Condorcet etc—^largely because the limitations of
space barely allow the authors of these articles to survey the writings and
leading ideas of their subjects. For a major figure Dr.Johnson receives less
than adequate space. M. A. Box repeats the more recent judgment that Dr.
Johnson was not the reactionary royalist,Jacobite, and counter-Enlighten
ment critic that he was generally thought to have been. Attending mainly
to Johnson's politics and religion, his "establishmentarianism," and (under
"utilitarianism") his moral theory. Box concludes by observing that even
though Johnson warned his readers "not to 'do evil that good may come,'
he was not advocating deontology over consequentialism, but rather rule
over act utilitarianism" (II, 303). These abstractions may serve well in a
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seminar on ethical theory, but Box places an unusual burden on the many
readers not trained in contemporary moral theory. Fortunately this
encyclopedia includes Manuel Kuehn's article "Utilitarianism," so that
readers can find some help on consequentialism ^ar. 3). Kuehn early
distinguishes between "act-centered theory" and "agent-centered theory,"
but that does not help readers who do not yet understand the meanings of
deontology, act utilitarianism and rule utilitarianism.
It is hard to say which articles will gain a wider readership and
possibly appear as required readings for undergraduates and/or graduate
students. Perhaps"Enlightenment Studies" and the "CounterT-Enlightenment" article? Courses on any aspect of the Enlightenment will be
enriched wherever this encyclopedia becomes available. Those who teach
courses on the Enlightenment and feel sufficiendy acquainted with Vico,
Montesquieu, Locke, Hume, Paine and Cartesianism will be especially
attracted to minor figures such as Nordenflycht or Meijer or Pinto or
Jaquelot, and there are many more. Those who have concentrated on the
Enlightenment in Western Europe will be impressed by the career and
accomplishments of Lomonosov, if they are not yet familiar with that
name. So far as I know, no work currendy covering the Enlightenment can
boast of having a wider range of biographical and topical articles. I have
noted a variety of imperfections in this collective work, but they do not
deflect from the immense value of the whole.
As for the future of this encyclopedia, I would be surprised if sooner
or later it did not appear in a variety of digital formats. We have already
observed the transformation of hard copy editions of The Johns Hopkins
Guide to Literaty Theory and Criticism, the Dictionary of the History of Ideas, and
the Dictionary of Literary Biograpiy into digitized texts that are now widely
available through the Internet. There are many advantages in using this
hard copy edition, but when it becomes an electronic edition corrections
can be made to the text whenever necessary and the system of cross
references can be significantly augmented by introdudi^ the pattern of a
hypertext edition. The conversion to digital or electronic format can also
enable the editors to introduce flexible sorting techniques, so that anyone
who wishes to know precisely which articles deal with Latin American or
Russian or Jewish or geological subject matter will easily be able to find
them. (The current index is useful for such a search, to a limited extent.)
Even more valuable than this sorting feature would be full searchability for
words and phrases. Considerations of this sort may lead us to hope that the
making of this reference work in four hard-copy volumes is only the first
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stage in a larger process that will increase its value and expand its utility
worldwide.

